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A	b	s	t	r	a	c	t	
Drawing	on	Bourdieu’s	political	economy	of	symbolic	forms	and	symbolic	power,	
and	 on	 an	 ethnography	 of	 gem	 mining	 rituals	 in	 Sri	 Lanka,	 this	 paper	 aims	 to	
provide	 an	 empirical	 illustration	 of	 the	 connection	between	 calculative	 practices	
and	 the	 social	 structure	 of	 capital.	 It	 shows	 how	 capital	 is	 socially	 structured	
around	 particular	 fields	 of	 reproduction,	 how	 the	 field‐specific	 organisation	 of	
capital	 is	 implicated	 in	 the	 presence	 and	 absence	 of	 calculative	 and	 control	
practices,	 and	 how	 calculative	 templates	 and	 procedures,	 as	 symbolic	 systems,	
simultaneously	 perform	 interrelated	 but	 distinct	 functions	 of	 cognition,	
communication	and	domination.	The	paper	advances	the	argument	that	calculative	
templates	 and	 procedures	 constitute	 a	 field‐specific	 logic	 and	 they	 are	 the	
symbolic	 means	 through	 which	 structural	 properties	 of	 the	 social	 systems	 are	
cognised,	 communicated,	 reproduced	 and	 transformed	 into	 a	 set	 of	 practical	
dispositions	that	orient	day‐to‐day	work	practices,	domination	and	resistance.	
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1.	Introduction	
Recently,	there	has	been	a	revitalisation	of	social	structural	approaches	to	the	theoretical	analyses	
of	 organisational	 practices.	 In	 particular,	 Bourdieu’s	 conceptions	 of	 field,	 practices,	 habitus	 and	
forms	of	capital	have	been	making	increasing	inroads	into	such	analyses	(e.g.	Everett,	2003,	2004;	
Fogarty,	 1998;	 Goddard,	 2004;	 Kurunmaki,	 1999b;	 Lounsbury,	 2008;	 Lounsbury	 and	 Ventresca,	
2003;	Lukka	and	Granlund,	2002;	Neu,	2006;	Neu	et	al.,	2003;	Ramirez,	2001;	Shenkin	and	Coulson,	
2007;	Xu	and	Xu,	2008).	Following	this	trend,	this	paper	aims	to	provide	an	empirical	illustration	of	
the	connection	between	calculative	practices	and	the	social	structure	of	capital.	Using	an	empirical	
case	of	gem	mining	rituals	in	Sri	Lanka,	the	paper	shows	how	capital	is	socially	structured	around	
particular	 fields	of	reproduction,	how	the	field‐specific	organisation	of	capital	 is	 implicated	in	 the	
presence	 and	 absence	 of	 calculative	 and	 control	 practices,	 how	 calculative	 templates	 and	
procedures,	 as	 symbolic	 systems,	 simultaneously	 perform	 interrelated	 but	 distinct	 functions	 of	
cognition,	 communication	 and	 domination	 and,	 after	 all,	 how	 domination,	 subjugation	 and	
resistance	 are	 scripted	 into	 day‐to‐day	 work	 practices.	 The	 paper	 advances	 the	 argument	 that	
calculative	 templates	 and	 procedures	 constitute	 a	 field‐specific	 logic	 and	 they	 are	 the	 symbolic	
means	 through	 which	 the	 structural	 properties	 of	 social	 systems	 are	 cognised,	 communicated,	
reproduced	 and	 transformed	 into	 a	 set	 of	 dispositions	 that	 orient	 day‐to‐day	 work	 practices,	
domination	and	resistance.	
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In	 doing	 so,	 with	 a	 view	 to	 locating	 it	 in	 its	 literary	 context,	 the	 paper	 will	 first	 introduce	 the	
accounting	 and	 control	 literature	 that	 draws	 on	 Bourdieu.	 Second,	 it	 will	 introduce	 Bourdieu’s	
sociology	of	symbolic	forms	and	symbolic	power	as	the	theoretical	foundation	of	the	paper.	Third,	
the	paper	will	discuss	 its	methodological	propositions	and	procedures,	 followed	by	 the	empirical	
work	 in	 four	 separate	 sections.	 Empirical	 sections	 are	 organised	 around	 the	 relations	 in	 and	 of	
production	 to	 reveal	 how	 field‐specific	 properties	 of	 habitus,	 bodily	 hexis,	 doxa	 and	 capital	 are	
implicated	 in	 the	 presence	 and	 absence	 of	 calculative	 and	 control	 practices.	 Finally,	 the	 paper	
concludes	with	a	theoretical	synthesis	of	the	empirics.	
	
2.	Bourdieu	in	accounting	literature	
There	 is	an	extant	body	of	 accounting	and	 control	 literature	 that	draws	on	Bourdieu’s	 ideas	 (see	
next	section	for	a	brief	elaboration	of	his	ideas).	This	body	of	literature	demonstrates	a	wide	variety	
in	 its	 empirical	 focus	 and	deployment	of	Bourdieu’s	 concepts.	Not	 surprisingly,	much	accounting	
and	control	research	draws	mainly	on	Bourdieu’s	concept	of	‘field’	to	explain	how	the	constitution	
of	cultural	and	social	capital	is	implicated	in	selected	accounting	phenomena.	Lee	(1995,	1999)	and	
Lee	and	Williams	(1999),	for	example,	drawing	on	Bourdieu’s	(1988)	study	of	the	French	academy	
in	 the	 late	 1960s,	 and	 on	 the	 history	 of	 the	 American	 Accounting	 Association	 as	 an	 empirical	
foundation,	 explain	 how	 the	 existence	 of	 an	 elite	 group	 of	 researchers	 within	 the	 ‘field’	 of	 US	
accounting	 education	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	 stratification	 of	 its	members	 according	 to	 a	 pole	 of	
cultural	 capital.	 They	 also	 look	 at	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 this	 stratification	 has	 had	 the	 potential	 to	
influence	 the	 knowledge	 production	 process	 and	 reproductive	 order	 of	 the	 accounting	 academy.	
Ramirez	(2001)	also	draws	on	the	concepts	of	field	and	capital,	looking	especially	at	how	the	lack	of	
solidity	 within	 the	 inner	 hierarchy	 of	 the	 professional	 accounting	 field	 vis‐à‐vis	 the	 overall	
hierarchy	 of	 social	 fields,	 helps	 in	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 failure	 of	 a	 French	 project	 of	 the	
institutionalisation	 of	 accounting	 before	 the	 Second	 World	 War.	 Again	 concentrating	 on	 the	
accounting	profession,	Jacobs	(2003)	draws	on	Bourdieu’s	conceptions	of	education,	distinction	and	
class	to	demonstrate	how	class	discriminations	are	reproduced	within	the	recruitment	practices	of	
the	Scottish	accounting	profession.	
	
Neu	et	al.	 (2001)	and	Cooper	et	al.	 (2005)	draw	on	Bourdieu’s	work	to	analyse	a	rather	different	
issue:	the	functioning	of	accounting	within	public	policy	struggles	and	the	interventional	strategies	
that	 critical	 accounting	 researchers	 can	 pursue	 in	 making	 a	 socio‐political	 critique	 of	 the	
dominating	ideologies	of	state	and	corporate	capitalism.	Drawing	mainly	on	Bourdieu’s	analysis	of	
the	 functioning	 of	 intellectuals	 and	 the	 politics	 of	 cultural	 production,	 they	 emphasise	 the	
importance	of	 “universal	 intellectualism”	 in	 this	regard	(see	Bourdieu,	1991a;	Neu	et	al.,	2001,	p.	
740).	The	contemporary	political	role	of	critical	academic	accountants	(i.e.	active	engagement	in	the	
outside	world)	has	also	been	the	point	of	focus	for	Cooper	(2002).	She	turns	towards	the	academic	
and	 political	 work	 of	 Bourdieu	 (especially	 The	Weight	 of	 the	World,	 Bourdieu,	 1999)	 to	 offer	 a	
persuasive	 critique	 on	 our	 apathy	 towards	 active	 political	 engagements	 in	 policy	 critiques	 and	
social	reformations.	Taking	 the	case	of	Clydesbank	asbestos	sufferers,	 the	tuition	 fee	campaign	 in	
Scotland	 and	 also	 the	 political	 role	 that	 the	 Centre	 for	 Social	 and	 Environmental	 Accounting	
Research	plays	in	promoting	critical	ideologies	as	illustrations,	she	argues	that	real	world	political	
engagements	should	have	the	“double	benefit	of	allowing	us	to	hone	our	theoretical	understanding	
and	gain	the	satisfaction	of	knowing	that	our	work	is	of	social	benefit”	(Cooper,	2002,	p.	461).	
	
Shenkin	and	Coulson’s	(2007)	paper	examines	a	similar	theme:	the	idea	of	social	activism	directed	
against	 the	 corporate	 hegemony.	 Based	 on	 the	 Boudieuian	 idea	 that	 communication	 is	 seen	 to	
reflect	 an	 asymmetrical	 power	 relationship	 between	 social	 agents	 who	 constantly	 struggle	 over	
limited	 resources	 in	 a	 field,	 they	 conceptualise	 the	 academic	 field	 of	 Social	 and	 Environmental	
Accounting	 (SEA)	 as	 a	 discursive	 space	 within	 which	 two	 philosophical	 positions	 compete	 for	
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recognition:	the	procedural	school	of	SEA	and	“social	activism”.	However,	contrary	to	the	position	
of	 Neu	 et	 al.	 (2001)	 that	 discourses	 of	 pragmatism,	 appeals	 to	 “commonsense”,	 and	 calls	 to	 be	
“practical”	are	the	dangers	of	the	critical	accounting	odyssey	(see	also	Cooper,	2002,	pp.	460–461),	
Shenkin	 and	 Coulson	 (2007)	 seek	 possibilities	 for	 converging	 the	 two	 ideological	 positions.	
Accounting	academia	has	also	been	the	‘field’	of	study	for	Everett’s	(2008)	analysis	of	how	editorial	
proximity	 is	 implicated	 in	publication	 success.	He	 relies	 on	Bourdieu’s	 concepts	of	 “rational	 self‐
interest”	and	a	“good‐faith	economy”,	which	he	utilises	 to	see	how	actors	 in	accounting	academia	
cultivate	 “preferred	 taste”,	 the	 inculcation	 of	 which	 is	 argued	 to	 be	 a	 key	 factor	 in	 publication	
success	 (pp.	 1150–1151).	 The	 notion	 of	 the	 “economy	 of	 symbolic	 goods”	 (Bourdieu,	 1998)	 has	
been	the	explanatory	tool	for	the	analysis	made	by	Neu	et	al.	(2003)	into	ethical	discourses	in	the	
Canadian	 accounting	 profession.	 By	 conceptualising	 character‐based	 and	 rule‐based	 ethical	
discourses	as	types	of	embodied	and	objective	cultural	goods,	respectively,	and	by	linking	these	two	
types	 of	 cultural	 goods	 to	 two	 different	 cultural	 goods	 markets	 (restricted,	 anti‐economic	 and	
widespread	economic),	respectively,	they	explain	how	and	why	ethical	discourses	fulfil	binding	and	
legitimacy	functions.	Thus,	analysis	of	the	fields	of	accounting	academia	and	professions	has	been	a	
popular	empirical	field	for	those	accounting	researchers	who	draw	on	Bourdieu.	
	
Kurunmaki	 (1999a,	 1999b)	 also	 draws	 on	 the	 notions	 of	 field	 and	 capital	 to	 conceptualise	 the	
Finish	health	care	sector	as	a	site	of	continuous	struggle	for	power	and	control.	She	demonstrates	
how	 the	 field	 is	 structured	 as	 a	 game	 between	 those	 involved	 in	 the	 functions	 of	 financing,	
production	and	consumption	of	health	care,	how	the	distribution	of	differently	valued	capital	in	the	
field	 is	 implicated	 in	 their	 chances	 of	 winning	 and	 losing	 the	 game	 and	 how	 that	 particular	
distribution	of	capital	is	enacted	in	a	transition	from	professional	planning	and	control	to	market‐
based	 control.	 In	 a	 recent	 publication,	 Oakes	 and	 Young	 (2010)	 argue	 that	 accounting	 and	
accountability	convert	any	social	space	into	a	contested	field	in	which	struggles	over	symbolic	and	
cultural	capital	are	inevitable	and,	in	relation	to	the	accountability	discourses	around	the	American	
Indian	 Trust	 Fund	 debacle,	 they	 demonstrate	 how	 symbolic	 and	 cultural	 capitals	 enable	 their	
holders	 to	 generate	 and	 control	 discourse	 around	 accountability,	 and	 use	 that	 discourse	 with	
authority	and	ease.	
	
Neu	et	al.	(2006)	combine	Foucauldian	literature	on	governmentality	with	Bourdieu’s	ideas	of	field	
and	habitus	to	examine	how	the	World	Bank	has	used	an	assemblage	of	information	and	reporting	
practices,	within	accounting/financial	expertise,	to	influence	administrative	practices	in	the	field	of	
Latin	American	education.	They	demonstrate	how	information	can	be	fabricated,	in	a	field‐specific	
manner,	 via	 the	 intersection	 of	 the	 newly	 implanted	 financial	 technologies,	 the	 pre‐existing	
information	 systems,	 and	 the	 taken‐for‐granted	habitus	of	 the	 field.	The	 same	synthesis	between	
Foucauldian	 and	 Bourdieuian	 ideas	 has	 also	 been	 the	 sociological	 framework	 for	 Neu’s	 (2006)	
examination	 of	 how	 accounting	 is	 implicated	 in	 the	 ordering	 of	 the	 public	 space.	 His	 analysis	
highlights	 how	 the	 financial	 and	 accountability	 mechanisms	 used	 by	 a	 Canadian	 provincial	
government	 as	 part	 of	 its	 educational	 reform	 initiatives	 facilitated	 changes	 in	 the	 types	 and	
amounts	 of	 capital	 of	 certain	 field	 participants,	 encouraged	 the	 partitioning	 of	 generic	 social	
groupings	(such	as	parents	and	academic	 labour)	 into	more	 finely	distinguished	social	groupings,	
and	 introduced	new	ways	of	 saying	 and	doing	 into	 the	 field	 (p.	391).	Rahaman	et	 al.	 (2007)	also	
mobilise	the	same	theoretical	synthesis	to	demonstrate,	using	the	case	of	the	privatisation	of	water	
services	in	Ghana,	how	accounting	and	its	users	provide	external	agencies,	such	as	the	World	Bank,	
with	a	source	of	symbolic	capital	as	a	means	of	controlling	the	field	from	a	distance.	
	
Baxter	and	Chua	(2008)	take	Bourdieuian	analysis	 in	accounting	to	a	different	domain	when	they	
take	 up	 Bourdieu’s	 practice	 theory,	 especially	 the	 notion	 of	 habitus,	 to	 examine	 how	 one	 enacts	
being	a	chief	financial	officer	(CFO),	using	a	case	study	of	a	CFO	in	a	large	Australian	organisation.	
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Although	they	tend	to	neglect	the	dialectics	of	his	position	and	his	notion	of	embodied	capital	with	
wider	 relations	of	 power,	 their	 analysis	 demonstrates	 the	 CFO’s	 day‐to‐day	 engagement	with	his	
position	 and	 how	 his	 “self‐professed	 high	 profile”,	 as	 a	 sort	 of	 cultural	 capital,	 enabled	 him	 to	
position	 himself	 as	 CFO.	 In	 an	 interesting	 attempt	 to	 attribute	 the	 notion	 of	 habitus	 to	 an	
organisational	entity,	Free	and	Macintosh	(2009)	explain	the	demise	of	Enron	though	the	evolution	
of	its	system	of	habitus	over	two	distinct	eras	of	leadership.	Their	analysis	not	only	concentrates	on	
how	corporate	leaders	enact	themselves	in	their	positions	through	their	cultural	capital	and	habitus	
but	also	how	such	enactment	 is	 implicated	in	the	corporate	control	structures	and	administrative	
practices,	as	well	as	in	the	games	that	field	incumbents	play	against	both	each	other	and	the	control	
structures	that	are	meant	to	govern	their	behaviour.	
	
Business	planning	and	budgeting	have	been	the	focus	of	two	other	studies.	Oakes	et	al.	(1998)	draw	
on	Bourdieu’s	concepts	of	field,	capital	and	pedagogical	practice	to	analyse	business	planning	in	the	
provincial	museums	and	cultural	heritage	sites	of	Alberta,	Canada.	They	show	how	such	business	
planning,	 as	 a	 mechanism	 of	 control	 and	 a	 form	 of	 symbolic	 violence,	 works	 subtly	 through	
language	and	the	construction	and	use	of	knowledge.	In	an	attempt	to	synthesise	grounded	theory	
(Strauss	 and	 Corbin,	 1990)	 and	 Bourdieu’s	 concept	 of	 habitus,	 Goddard	 (2004)	 examines	 the	
relationship	between	the	budget	process,	accountability,	trust	and	power	in	local	government	in	the	
UK.	 Habitus,	 here,	 can	 explain	 how	 perceptions	 of	 accountability	 are	 constructed	 and	 how	 they	
influence	budget	practices.	
	
A	 recent	paper	by	Hamilton	and	Ó	hÓgartaigh	 (2009)	 comes	 rather	 closer	 to	 the	way	 I	 intend	 to	
deploy	Bourdieu	in	this	paper.	Their	attention	is	on	how	accounting	doctrines,	especially	the	notion	
of	true	and	fair	view	(TFV),	become	what	they	are:	systems	of	symbolic	violence	that	maintain	and	
reinforce	 the	 institutionalised	 hierarchy	 of	 the	 accounting	 field.	 Together	 with	 certain	 (implicit)	
notions	of	symbolic	systems	and	violence,	they	draw	on	Bourdieu’s	conception	of	habitus	to	explore	
how	 professional	 rites	 and	 rituals	 of	 “native	 virtuosos”	who	 have	 a	 “feel	 for	 the	 game”	 produce	
“legitimate	language”	of	accounting	and	how	that	language	in	turn	reproduces	structural	properties	
of	 the	 field	 within	 which	 such	 rites,	 rituals	 and	 agential	 bodies	 that	 perform	 those	 rituals	 are	
situated.	 This	 is	 akin	 to	 my	 argument	 in	 this	 paper	 that	 calculative	 templates	 and	 procedures	
constitute	 a	 field‐specific	 logic	 and	 they	 are	 the	 symbolic	 means	 through	 which	 structural	
properties	of	 the	social	systems	are	 cognised,	communicated,	 reproduced	and	transformed	 into	a	
set	of	practical	dispositions	that	orient	day‐to‐day	work	practices,	domination	and	resistance.	
	
Most	of	the	prior	literature	is	subject	to	a	common	criticism	that	it	failed	to	incorporate	all	three	of	
Bourdieu’s	 master	 concepts	 –	 habitus,	 capital	 and	 field	 –	 into	 a	 single	 study	 (see	 Free	 and	
Macintosh,	 2009;	 Swartz,	 2008).	 As	 Free	 and	 Macintosh	 (2009)	 argue,	 Bourdieu	 (1998,	 p.	 85)	
identifies	 all	 three	 concepts	 as	 indispensable,	 and	 there	 is	 a	 danger	 of	 missing	 his	 ‘relational	
approach’	when	those	concepts	are	appropriated	piecemeal.	As	a	result,	much	of	their	explanatory	
power	is	lost	and	the	richness	of	a	full‐blown	analysis	is	underachieved	(Free	and	Macintosh,	2009,	
p.	 4).	 That	 said,	 as	 Emirbayer	 and	 Johnson	 (2008)	 argue,	 in	 this	 kind	 of	 analysis	 the	 dynamic	
properties	of	the	theory	and	the	relation	between	the	concepts	is	lost.	However,	this	literature	need	
not	be	demeaned	simply	as	 a	 result	of	 its	violation	of	 the	 relational	 tenants	of	Bourdieu’s	 theory	
because,	as	Vaughan	(2008)	argues,	excising	a	concept	and	examining	it	in	different	social	settings	
has	contributed	to	our	body	of	knowledge	on	accounting	and	control.	
	
Even	 though	 a	 theory	 by	 definition	 requires	 the	 interdependence	 of	 parts	 to	 formulate	 an	
explanation,	as	Vaughan	(2008,	p.	67)	argues,	a	concept	becomes	separated	from	its	whole	mainly	
due	 to	 the	 “scholar	 preference”,	 which	 is	 a	 conditioned	 outcome	 of	 the	 competition	 among	
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alternative	 theoretical	 frameworks,	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 theory	 in	 question,	 the	 researcher’s	
specialisation	and	data	availability.	Thus,	
It	is	not	that	organizational	sociologists	have	failed	to	grasp	the	relational	aspects	
of	 Bourdieu’s	 theory.	 One	 or	 all	 –	 competing	 paradigms,	 theory	 complexity,	 and	
specialization	and	data	availability	–	can	be	obstacles	to	incorporating	a	full	theory	
into	 an	 empirical	 analysis	 because	 any	 or	 all	 of	 the	 three	may	 prevent	 us	 from	
seeing	the	relevance	of	the	whole,	even	as	these	same	factors	may	enable	us	to	see	
the	relevance	of	one	or	more	of	the	theory’s	parts	(Vaughan,	2008,	p.	67).	
	
With	regard	to	this	paper,	I	was	fortunate	to	gain	deep	ethnographic	access	to	a	particular	field	that	
offered	the	chance	to	incorporate,	inter	alia,	Bourdieu’s	key	concepts	–	field,	capital	and	habitus	–	in	
a	 relational	 manner	 to	 demonstrate	 how	 they	 explain	 collectively	 the	 presence	 and	 absence	 of	
calculative	 and	 control	 practices.	 The	 analysis,	 while	 fundamentally	 grounded	 on	 ethnographic	
data,	uses	Bourdieu’s	‘political	economy	of	symbolic	forms	and	symbolic	power’,	where	emphasis	is	
placed	on	the	role	of	symbolic	forms	and	processes	in	the	reproduction	of	social	inequalities.	This	is	
not	the	only	feature	that	distinguishes	this	paper	from	other	accounting	and	control	research	that	
draws	 on	 Bourdieu.	 The	 paper	 also	 differs	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 cultural	 political	 specificities	 of	 the	
ethnographic	field:	an	ethnography	of	a	pre‐capitalistic	mode	of	production	that	survives	in	a	less‐
developed	country,	providing	an	opportunity	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	stream	of	accounting	 literature	
that	deals	with	the	‘absence	of	accounting’	(Choudhury,	1988;	Jacobs	and	Kemp,	2002).	
	
3.	Political	economy	of	symbolic	forms	and	power	
Bourdieu’s	work	can	be	taken,	he	believes	(Bourdieu,	1989,	p.	14),	as	“constructivist	structuralism”	
or	“structuralist	constructivism”,	within	which	he	tries	to	reconcile	two	aspects	of	social	genesis;	on	
the	one	hand,	the	schemes	of	perception,	thought,	and	action	that	are	constitutive	of	what	he	calls	
habitus	and,	on	 the	other,	 the	social	 structures	of	what	he	 terms	 fields	and	classes/groups.	Thus,	
through	 a	 reconceptualisation	 of	 the	 relations	 between	 the	 symbolic	 (subjective)	 and	 material	
(objective)	dimensions	of	social	life,	he	develops	a	political	economy	of	symbolic	forms	and	power	
that	 attempts	 to	 provide	 a	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 how	 social	 inequalities	 are	
reproduced	 through	 practices	 of	 symbolic	 power	 and	 symbolic	 violence.	 At	 the	 centre	 of	 this	
theoretical	construction	lies	the	role	of	symbolic	systems	(which	include	arts,	science,	religion	and	
language)	as	structuring	structures	that	mediate	practices	by	connecting	individuals	and	groups	to	
institutionalised	 hierarchies	 (see	 Swartz,	 1997,	 p.	 1).	 Systems	 of	 calculations	 are	 such	 symbolic	
systems,	 which	 mediate	 the	 effects	 of	 wider	 power	 structures	 to	 produce	 various	 forms	 of	
calculative	and	control	practices.	
	
For	Bourdieu,	 the	socialised	body	does	not	stand	 in	opposition	to	society;	 it	 is	one	of	 its	 forms	of	
existence.	Social	reality	exists	both	inside	and	outside	social	actors,	in	both	our	cognitive	structures	
and	objective	social	structures,	manifested	by	the	material	existence	of	things	outside	our	cognitive	
structures.	 Thus,	 in	 our	 sociological	 analyses,	 the	 individual	 and	 society	 should	 be	 constructed	
relationally,	 as	 if	 they	 are	 two	 dimensions	 of	 the	 same	 social	 reality	 (see	 Swartz,	 1997,	 p.	 96).	
Bourdieu	 constructs	 this	 inseparable	 connection	 between	 the	 socialised	 body	 and	 the	 structural	
logics	of	the	social	space	through	a	set	of	conceptual	devices:	some	of	which	are	more	related	to	the	
socialised	body	while	others	are	more	a	means	of	understanding	the	structural	logic	of	the	“field”.	
There	 is	 also	 another	 set	 that	 is	 related	 to	 social	 processes	 and	 the	 relations	 through	which	 one	
class/group	 of	 social	 actors	 would	 exercise	 symbolic	 power	 over	 others.	 The	 “practical	 logic”	
(Bourdieu,	1990b)	of	calculative	and	control	practices	needs	to	be	understood	within	this	relational	
dynamic	between	the	socialised	body	and	the	structural	logic	of	the	field.	Thus,	the	attempt	here	is	
to	 grasp	 the	 totality	 of	 his	 theoretical	 construct	 and	 to	 locate	 the	 ‘logic	 of	 calculative	 practices’	
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therein.	 Fig.	 1	 provides	 an	 outline	 for	 my	 conceptualisation	 of	 Bourdieu’s	 political	 economy	 of	
symbolic	forms	and	symbolic	power.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Fig.	1.	Bourdieu’s	political	economy	of	symbolic	forms	and	power.	
	
In	 Bourdieu’s	 political	 economy,	 ‘field’	 is	 the	 structure	 of	 a	 conflictual	 social	 setting	 or	 ‘field	 of	
struggle’,	 in	 the	 context	 of	which	his	 other	 concepts	 are	 to	 be	 located	 and	understood.	A	 field	 is	
meant	 to	encompass	a	 structural	 logic	according	 to	which	specific	 types	of	 capital	are	 competing	
against	each	other	for	a	stake	in	the	game;	every	field	has	its	own	self‐defining	stakes	and	interests,	
which	are	irreducible	to	the	stakes	and	interests	specific	to	other	fields	(Bourdieu,	1995,	p.	72).	As	
such,	a	field	becomes	a	structured	space	of	dominant	and	subordinate	positions	based	on	types	and	
amounts	of	capital	(Swartz,	1997,	p.	123).	The	structural	logic	of	a	field	imposes	on	actors	specific	
forms	of	struggle,	which	they	internalise	through	various	forms	of	embodiment;	they	then	mobilise	
such	embodied	or	objectified	properties	as	a	form	of	capital	to	pursue	their	specific	interests	in	the	
field	as	well	as	to	resist	the	dominating	influences	stemming	from	the	other	forms	of	capital	in	the	
field.	
	
3.1.	Forms	of	embodiment	
Reading	through	Fig.	1,	the	set	of	concepts	in	Box	A	shows	the	different	ways	in	which	individuals	
and	groups	embody	the	structural	logic	of	the	field.	They	are	the	mode	of	reproducing	the	objective	
social	structures	within	the	cognitive	schemata	of	the	socialised	body,	and	the	media	through	which	
the	socialised	body	is	facilitated	to	produce	actions	according	to	the	logic	of	the	field.	However,	such	
Socialised 
body 
(individuals and 
groups) 
Structural logic of the 
field 
(institutionalised 
social hierarchies) 
Symbolic systems as 
instruments of  
1. cognition  
2. communication 
3. domination  
Forms of embodiment  
 Symbolic interests  
 Habitus 
 Doxa 
 Bodily hexis 
 Illusio 
Forms of capital 
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actions	 are	 not	 mechanical	 responses	 to	 external	 determining	 structures.	 Instead,	 symbolic	
interests,	habitus,	and	other	forms	of	the	embodiment	of	the	cultural	and	social	legacies	of	the	past	
filter	and	shape	individual	and	collective	responses	to	the	present	and	future	(see	Swartz,	1997,	p.	
69).	 In	 other	 words,	 structural	 ‘distinctions’	 manifested	 by	 the	 institutionalised	 hierarchies	 are	
embodied	distinctively	by	individuals	belonging	to	different	social	categories	in	order	to	reproduce	
different	mindsets	and	behaviours	in	distinctive	social	situations/fields.	
	
As	 Swartz	 (1997,	 pp.	 66–73)	 also	 argues,	 Bourdieu	 posits	 that	 all	 actions	 are	 patterned	 and	
interest‐oriented	 at	 a	 tacit,	 prereflective	 level	 of	 awareness	 that	 occurs	 over	 time.	 However,	
Bourdieu’s	concept	of	symbolic	interests	should	not	be	read	as	an	independent	principle	of	action	
within	his	conceptual	framework.	Instead,	material	and	symbolic	interests	are	defined	by	an	actor’s	
(or	 group	 of	 actors)	 position	 within	 institutionalised	 hierarchies.	 They	 are	 the	 embodied	
dispositions	that	operate	at	a	tacit,	taken‐for‐granted	level	(Swartz,	1997,	p.	71).	Thus,	“interest	is	a	
historical	arbitrary,	a	historical	construction	that	can	be	known	only	through	historical	analysis,	ex	
post,	 through	empirical	 observation”	 (Wacquant,	 1989,	 p.	42).	Nevertheless,	 actors	participate	 in	
social	interactions	and	pursue	symbolic	and	material	interests	as	strategists	who	respond	over	time	
to	 a	 mass	 of	 constraints	 and	 opportunities	 that	 they	 grasp	 through	 “practical	 knowledge”	 or	 a	
“sense	of	practice”	(Swartz,	1997,	pp.	99–100).	In	this	sense,	actors	“are	strategic	improvisers	who	
respond	dispositionally	to	the	opportunities	and	constraints	offered	by	various	situations”.	And	the	
“choices	 stem	 from	 practical	 dispositions	 that	 incorporate	 ambiguities	 and	 uncertainties	 that	
emerge	from	acting	through	time	and	space”	(Swartz,	1997,	p.	100).	
	
When	the	structural	logic	of	the	field	is	internalised	as	habitus	and	bodily	hexis,	“the	point	of	view	
of	those	who	dominate	by	dominating	the	.	.	.	[field]	and	who	have	constituted	their	point	of	view	as	
universal	by	constituting	the	 .	 .	 .	 [field]”	(Bourdieu,	1998,	p.	57),	 is	also	embodied.	This	dominant	
vision,	often	manifested	as	 the	orthodoxy	of	a	particular	 field,	 is	 the	doxa.	 Internalising	 the	doxic	
disposition	means	submission	to	the	logic	of	symbolic	domination	in	the	field.	By	the	same	token,	
social	agents	who	compete	for	their	material	and	symbolic	interests	in	a	particular	field	also	ingrain	
the	 illusio	that	 leads	one	to	engage	 in	the	central	game	of	the	 field:	 they	 ingrain	the	 idea	that	the	
game	is	worth	playing,	invest	in	it,	and	are	taken	in	by	it	(see	Bourdieu	and	Wacquant,	1992,	pp.	98,	
115,	173).	
	
3.2.	Forms	of	capital	
For	 Bourdieu	 (1986,	 p.	 241),	 following	 Marx,	 the	 social	 world	 consists	 of	 accumulated	 history;	
capital	 is	 accumulated	 labour	 in	 its	 material	 or	 embodied	 forms.	 When	 appropriated	 on	 an	
exclusive	basis	by	agents,	capital	enables	them	to	appropriate	social	energy	in	the	form	of	reified	or	
living	 labour.	 As	 such,	 individuals	 and	 groups	 draw	 upon	 various	 forms	 of	 capital	 in	 order	 to	
maintain	 or	 enhance	 their	 relative	 positions	 in	 the	 social	 order	 and,	 in	 that	 struggle,	 capital	
becomes	 a	 “social	 relation	 of	 power”	 (Swartz,	 1997,	 p.	 73).	 Capital,	 therefore,	 represents	 power	
“over	 the	mechanisms	which	tend	to	ensure	the	production	of	a	particular	category	of	goods	and	
thus	 over	 a	 set	 of	 revenues	 and	 profits”	 (Bourdieu,	 1991b).	 However,	 unlike	 Marx,	 Bourdieu	
extends	 the	 idea	 of	 capital	 to	 all	 forms	 of	 power:	material,	 cultural,	 social	 or	 symbolic.	 Thus,	 for	
Bourdieu,	capital	can	take	different	forms:	economic,	cultural	and	social	capital.	
	
While	economic	capital	is	institutionalised	in	the	form	of	property	rights,	cultural	and	social	capital	
take	 somewhat	 subjective	 and	 complex	 forms.	 For	 example,	 cultural	 capital	 can	 exist	 in	 three	
different	 states:	 the	 embodied	 state	 (i.e.	 in	 the	 form	of	 long‐lasting	dispositions	 of	 the	mind	 and	
body);	 the	objectified	state	of	 tangible	cultural	products,	such	as	uniforms	and	other	dress	codes,	
pictures,	books,	machines;	and	the	institutionalised	state,	such	as	accreditations	and	qualifications	
(Bourdieu,	 1986).	 Similarly,	 social	 capital	 represents	 durable	 networks	 of	 institutionalised	
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relationships	of	mutual	acquaintances	and	recognition,	which	provides	individual	social	actors	with	
a	“credential”	that	helps	them	to	exploit	and	dominate	the	social	relationships	in	a	particular	field	of	
power	 (Bourdieu,	 1986,	 pp.	 248–49).	 Importantly,	 in	 Bourdieu’s	 sociology,	 capital	 is	 not	 only	 a	
force	 inscribed	 in	 subjective	 and	 objective	 structures	 but	 also	 the	 principle	 underlying	 the	
immanent	regularities	of	the	particular	field.	Accordingly,	habitus,	bodily	hexis,	and	other	forms	of	
embodiment	of	the	structural	properties	of	the	field	by	individual	social	actors	can	become,	in	the	
long	run,	embodied	forms	of	capital	which,	in	turn,	can	be	mobilised	to	accumulate	other	forms	of	
capital	 (especially	 economic	 capital)	 by	 dominating	 the	 field	 and	 appropriating	 its	 surplus	 value	
through	symbolic	means.	This	symbolic	form	of	dominating	and	exploiting	the	social	relations	in	a	
field	 of	 power	 is	 known	 as	 symbolic	 violence,	 which	 takes	 place	 through	 symbolic	 systems	 and	
instruments.	
	
3.3.	Symbolic	systems	
Symbolic	 violence	 is	 the	 subtle	 domination	 of	 one	 class	 of	 social	 actors	 by	 another	 through	
imposing	the	means	for	comprehending	and	adapting	to	the	social	world	by	representing	economic	
and	 political	 power	 in	 disguised,	 taken‐for‐granted	 forms.	 This	 is	 realised	 through	 symbolic	
systems	that	exercise	their	power	through	the	complicity	of	those	who	are	subject	to	it	(Bourdieu,	
1991b).	The	arts,	science,	religion	and,	indeed,	all	symbolic	systems	–	including	calculative	systems	
–	 are	not	 only	 instruments	 of	 communication	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 reality	 but	 also	 the	means	
through	which	social	hierarchies	and	inequalities	are	established	and	reproduced.	They	constitute	
the	social	mechanisms	that	connect	individual	social	actors	to	institutionalised	hierarchies.	
	
According	 to	 Bourdieu	 (1979),	 symbolic	 systems	 simultaneously	 perform	 three	 interrelated	 but	
distinct	 functions:	 cognition	 (symbolic	 systems	 as	 structuring	 structures),	 communication	
(symbolic	systems	as	structured	structures),	and	domination	(symbolic	systems	as	instruments	of	
domination).	In	the	first	two	functions	(cognition	and	communication	as	structuring	and	structured	
structures),	 symbolic	systems	become	instruments	of	knowledge	and	communication	that	exert	a	
symbolic	power:	a	power	to	construct	reality	as	a	gnoseological	order,	and	social	solidarity	resting	
on	shared	symbolic	systems	and	their	resultant	gnoseological	order.	As	such,	they	make	possible	a	
consensus	on	the	sense	of	the	social	world	(Bourdieu,	1979,	p.	79).	Thus,	as	a	gnoseological	order,	
the	structural	 logic	of	a	particular	 field	 is	cognised	and	communicated	through	symbolic	systems.	
Various	 calculative	 systems	 can	 thus	 become	 symbolic	 instruments	 of	 cognition	 and	
communication;	 they	 become	 systems	 that	materialise	 the	 deep	 social	 structures	 of	 a	 particular	
field.	
	
Relations	 of	 communication	 are	 always,	 inseparably,	 relations	 of	 power	 (Bourdieu,	 1979,	 p.	 80)	
and,	in	that	sense,	symbolic	systems	also	function	as	instruments	of	domination,	or	as	instruments	
that	legitimate	domination.	The	dominant	factions	of	a	particular	field,	whose	power	is	often	based	
on	 economic	 and	 political	 capital,	 seek	 to	 legitimate	 their	 domination	 through	 various	 symbolic	
instruments,	 such	 as	 discourses	 and	 writings,	 which	 reproduces	 traditions	 of	 domination	 as	
historically	legitimate,	or	transforms	such	traditions	into	new	ones,	as	others	become	outdated	over	
time.	That	said,	forms	of	knowledge	and	relations	of	communication	are	inherently	enmeshed	with	
relations	 of	 power	 because	 they	 are	 the	 relations	 within	 which	 the	 dominating	 structures	 are	
reproduced.	Symbolic	systems,	as	structuring	and	structured	systems,	combine	their	cognitive	and	
communicative	functions	with	that	of	domination.	
	
Calculative	 systems	 are	 also	 structured	 and	 structuring	 systems.	 They	 are	 structured	 by	 their	
historical	evolution	as	tools	of	institutionalised	practices	and	also	as	embodied	dispositions	of	the	
social	 agents	who	mobilise,	 and	 are	 subject	 to,	 such	 calculative	 practices.	 As	 such	 they	 bear	 the	
structural	conditions	of	the	field	in	which	they	evolved	and	operate.	They	are	structuring	because	
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they	orient	and	shape	the	actions	and	practices	of	social	agents	and	institutions.	They	are	structures	
in	 that	 they	 hold	 a	 set	 of	 systematically	 interrelated	 templates,	 procedures	 and	 mechanics,	
according	 to	which	 day‐to‐day	work	 and	 other	 social	 practices	 are	 cognised,	 communicated	 and	
regulated.	 Calculative	 systems	 not	 only	 perform	 cognitive	 and	 communicative	 functions	 but	 also	
serve	as	instruments	of	domination.	They,	as	symbolic	systems,	“provide	integration	for	dominant	
groups,	 distinctions	 and	 hierarchies	 for	 ranking	 groups,	 and	 legitimation	 of	 social	 ranking	 by	
encouraging	the	dominated	to	accept	the	existing	hierarchies	of	social	distinction.	They,	therefore,	
fulfil	 a	 political	 function”	 (Swartz,	 1997,	 p.	 83,	 see	 also	 Bourdieu,	 1979).	 After	 all,	 calculative	
templates,	procedures	and	mechanics	are	 instruments	through	which	dominating	forms	of	capital	
appropriate	 the	 surplus	value	of	 the	 field.	 In	 the	empirical	 sections,	 after	 the	methodology,	 I	will	
show	how	a	particular	calculative	system,	as	a	symbolic	system,	performs	these	three	functions	and	
thereby	reproduces	the	dominating	structures	of	the	field	of	Sri	Lankan	gem	mining.	
	
4.	Research	methods	and	site	
Methodology	 is	 neither	 a	 technique	 of	 data	 collection	 nor	 a	 specific	 branch	 of	 theory,	 but	 the	
framework	that	provides	the	link	between	technique	and	theory	(Burawoy,	1991).	Techniques	help	
identify	appearances	as	events,	 interactions,	practices	and	relationships.	However,	reality	 is	more	
than	mere	appearances	may	suggest.	Its	essence	lies	in	the	deep	social	structures,	which	should	be	
theoretically	 abstracted.	 The	 task	 of	 sociological	 research,	 according	 to	 Bourdieu	 (Bourdieu	 and	
Wacquant,	 1992,	 p.	 7)	 is	 “to	 uncover	 the	 most	 profoundly	 buried	 structures	 …	 as	 well	 as	 the	
mechanisms	which	tend	to	ensure	their	reproduction	or	their	transformation”.	However,	Bourdieu	
also	 writes	 that	 such	 structures	 are	 peculiar	 in	 that	 they	 lead	 a	 “double	 life”	 (Bourdieu	 and	
Wacquant,	1992,	p.	7):	 they	exist	 twice.	On	the	one	hand,	they	exist	 in	 the	“objectivity	of	the	first	
order”	 that	 is	 constituted	by	 the	distribution	of	 capital,	 or	 the	means	of	 appropriation	of	 surplus	
values.	On	the	other,	they	are	in	the	“objectivity	of	the	second	order”,	constituted	by	the	systems	of	
classification	 or	 the	 mental	 and	 bodily	 schemata	 (habitus,	 bodily	 hexis,	 etc.)	 that	 function	 as	
symbolic	templates	for	the	practical	activities	of	social	agents.	As	such,	a	field‐based	social	inquiry	
needs	a	dialectic	 reading	of	 this	double	 life	of	 field	 structure	and	demands	a	 set	of	methods	 that	
provide	the	researcher	with	broad	access	to	the	field	–	broad	enough	to	penetrate	the	mental	and	
bodily	schemata.	Thus,	with	the	understanding	that	day‐to‐day	social	practices	are	the	interactive	
bottom‐line	of	control,	resistance,	hegemony	and	calculations,	meaningful	access	matters	a	lot.	This	
is	why	ethnography	has	been	one	of	the	most	popular	research	methods	in	field‐based	sociological	
inquiries	 (Wacquant,	 2003,	 2004a,	 2004b).	 Ethnographic	 research	 generally	 involves	 intensive,	
face‐to‐face	 participant	 observation	 in	 a	 natural	 setting	 over	 a	 reasonable	 period	 to	 allow	 the	
researcher	to	produce	meaningful	narratives	of	the	actions,	practices	and	ideological	frameworks	of	
a	particular	social	system	(Willis,	2000).	This	research	adopts	such	an	ethnographic	approach	with	
a	broad	access	not	only	to	the	structural	properties	of	the	‘field’	of	gem	mining	in	Sri	Lanka	but	also	
to	 the	 particular	 forms	 of	 embodiment	 through	 which	 structural	 properties	 of	 the	 field	 are	
internalised	 by	 its	 agents.	 Very	 similar	 to	 Bourdieu’s	 Algerian	 ethnographies,	 the	 ethnographic	
setting	was	my	home	town1	where	I	spent	first	half	of	my	life,	and	where	my	extended	family	and	
village	friends	still	live.	They	have	various	stakes	in	gem	mining	in	the	area,	ranging	from	labouring	
in	the	gem	pits	to	wealthy	gem	merchants.	I	had	even	worked	a	couple	of	years	as	a	gem	pit	worker,	
though	 not	 during	 the	 period	 of	 formal	 fieldwork2.	 As	 in	 the	 case	 of	Wacquant	 (2004a,	 2004b)	
                                                            
1		Rakwana,	Sri	Lanka.	This	small	town	is	 located	in	the	district	of	Rathnapura	(literally	meaning	“city	of	gems”)	and	is	
famous	for	its	blue‐sapphire.	The	town	is	surrounded	by	quite	a	few	gem	pits	and	its	main	street	largely	populated	by	
gem	merchants.	
2	 	 This	was	 during	 the	 period	 from	 1986	 to	 1988,	 after	my	 A/L	 but	 before	 entering	 the	 university	 on	 a	 government	
scholarship.	All	public	universities	in	Sri	Lanka	were	closed	from	1986	to	1990	due	to	a	civil	war	in	the	country.	Thus	
there	was	a	period	of	discontinuity	in	my	“life	progress”	where	I	deployed	my	body	in	rather	“off‐line”	and	temporary	
occupations.	
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“Body	and	Soul”,	this	carnal	experience	of	being	a	pit	worker	has,	no	doubt,	helped	me	to	“clasp	and	
restitute	 the	 carnal	 dimensions	 of	 existence”	 (Wacquant,	 2004a,	 2004b,	 p.	 vii)	 as	 a	 pit	 worker.	
However,	 I	would	not	claim	that	 the	current	piece	of	research	 is	a	result	of	a	carnal	sociology:	“a	
sociology	not	only	of	the	body,	in	the	sense	of	object,	but	also	from	the	body,	that	is,	deploying	the	
body	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 inquiry	 and	 vector	 of	 knowledge”	 (Wacquant,	 2004a,	 2004b,	 p.	 viii,	 emphasis	
original).	My	deployment	of	body	as	a	gem	pit	worker	was	not	at	all	driven	by	such	a	sociological	
adventure	 but	 by	 the	mere	 economic	 and	 social	 necessities	 of	 its	 deployment	 in	 the	 field,	many	
years	before	the	(re)engagement	in	the	field	as	a	researcher.	
	
Initial	 data	 collection	was	achieved	over	a	nine‐month	period	of	 fieldwork	during	2001–02,	with	
two	subsequent	short	visits	to	the	field	in	2005	and	2007.	Data	collection	was	mainly	undertaken	
via	direct	participant	observation	and	‘engagement’	in	various	social	settings,	including	occasional	
gem	 pit	 operations,	 gem	 auctions,	 out‐of‐hours	 gatherings	 and	 social	 occasions.	 Every‐day	work	
activities	 and	 social	 relations	 were	 closely	 observed	 and	 transformed	 into	 field	 notes	 around	
calculative	and	control	practices,	and	ideologies	were	embedded	in	such	observations.	Continuous	
but	 distant	 contact	 is	 maintained	 with	 the	 field	 actors	 through	 ‘friendly	 and	 related’	 telephone	
conversations;	such	conversations	helped	a	lot	in	the	refinement	and	gap‐filling	of	field	notes	taken	
at	the	time	of	fieldwork.	At	the	writing‐up	stage,	the	field‐based	ethnography	was	transformed	into	
an	“analytic	ethnography”	(Snow	et	al.,	2003)	by	entwining	the	field‐data	with	a	theory	that	helps	
make	 ‘theoretical	 sense’	 of	 the	data.	 The	 analytical	 focus	was	mainly	on	 an	understanding	of	 the	
presence	 and	 absence	 of	 particular	 control	 practices	 and	 the	 field‐specific	 logic	 of	 calculative	
practices.	
	
Ethnographic	 data	 can	 be	 understood	 better	 when	 they	 are	 placed	 vis‐à‐vis	 the	 peculiar	
characteristics	 of	 the	 field.	 Hence	 more	 elaboration	 of	 the	 site	 is	 needed	 here.	 Sri	 Lanka	 is	 a	
postcolonial	developing	economy	with	a	population	of	20	million	and	a	per	capita	GDP	of	US$	2,053	
(Central	Bank	of	Sri	Lanka,	2009).	It	had	been	a	colony	of	British	Empire	for	more	than	150	years	
until	1948	when	it	became	an	independent	country.	According	to	Sri	Lankan	Central	Bank	statistics,	
its	current	economic	composition	is	dominated	by	garment	and	other	textile	products	(around	40%	
of	total	exports	during	the	last	decade	or	so)	and	plantation	crops	(around	20%	of	total	exports).	
Gem	mining	contributes	just	less	than	2%	of	the	nation’s	exports.	
	
Gem	mining	and	trading	in	the	country	are	mainly	concentrated	in	a	few	towns	and	villages	in	the	
Rathnapura	District.		This	high	geographical	concentration	of	the	industry	means	that	its	presence	
in	the	day‐to‐day	lives	of	people	in	these	towns	and	villages	is	much	more	significant	than	what	the	
centralised	 statistics	 suggest.	 A	mere	 visit	 to	 any	 of	 these	 gem	 trading	 towns	would	 reveal	 how	
“gem	money”	(as	the	accumulated	wealth	through	gem	mining	and	trading	is	commonly	known	in	
the	area)	is	present	everywhere	in	the	town:	in	the	sign‐boards	of	the	shops3,	sponsorship	banners	
of	various	 social	 events	by	wealthy	gem	merchants,	 large	houses	of	wealthy	gem	merchants,	 and	
also	 the	 physical	 presence	 of	 gem	 merchants	 and	 traders	 in	 their	 “symbolic”	 clothes	 (typically	
expensive	 batik	 sarongs,	 white	 shirts,	 gold	 watches,	 gold	 necklaces,	 and	 leather	 slippers).	 The	
                                                                                                                                                                                               
	
3	 	 Quite	 a	 few	 gem‐shops	 can	 be	 found	 in	 every	major	 town	 in	 the	 Rathnapura	 district.	 They	 belong	 to	wealthy	 gem	
merchants	and	are	normally	multi‐story	buildings.	However,	 there	are	no	any	gems	or	anything	else	to	sell	 in	there	
but	they	are	so	called	“buying	centres”	where	the	owner	merchant	and	his	associates	just	spend	the	day	waiting	for	
gems	 to	 arrive.	 There	 is	 no	 any	 special	 equipment	 or	 machinery	 for	 checking	 or	 processing	 of	 gems	 here	 either.	
Inspection	of	a	gem	for	its	quality	is	done	through	the	bear	eye	only	with	the	help	of	a	light	of	battery	powered	pen‐
torch,	which	gem	merchants	would	normally	carry	wherever	he	goes.	Hence,	these	gem‐shops	(with	a	huge	sign‐board	
with	the	name	of	gem	merchant)	is	rather	a	symbolic	form	of	capital	to	express	the	relative	wealth	of	the	merchant	
and	his	ability	to	buy	a	gem	of	any	value.	
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presence	 of	 “gem	 money”	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 local	 political	 processes,	 especially	 in	 the	
parliamentary	and	the	Provincial	Council	Elections	wealthy	gem	merchant	either	as	candidates	or	
as	 financial	supporters	of	other	leading	candidates.	In	essence,	“gem	money”	has	been	a	powerful	
force	in	the	economic,	social	and	political	lives	of	people	in	these	gem	towns	and	villages.	
	
Concentrating	on	the	Rakwana	town	and	nearby	villages,	where	I	did	my	fieldwork,	there	were	six	
“gem	 shops”	 (i.e.	 gem	 buying	 centres)	 in	 the	 town	 and	 there	 were	 four	 more	 wealthy	 gem	
merchants	operating	in	their	houses	without	a	separate	gem	shop	in	the	town.	There	were	around	
20	 gem	 mines	 at	 the	 vicinity	 of	 the	 town.	 In	 addition	 to	 their	 involvement	 in	 gem	 mining	 and	
trading,	some	of	these	gem	merchants	have	textile	and	hardware	shops	in	the	town.	They	have	also	
invested	in	small	and	medium	scale	tea	holdings.	Most	importantly,	they	lavishly	invest	in	various	
social	 activities	 and	 patronage	 politics	 to	 sustain	 the	 symbolic	 presence	 of	 “gem	 money”.	 Local	
politicians	 and	 leading	 government	 officers	 in	 the	 province	 would	 not	 visit	 the	 town	 without	
visiting	 some	of	 these	 gem	merchants	with	whom	 they	maintain	 long‐term	allegiances.	 It	 is	 very	
hard	to	see	a	gem	merchant	without	his	set	of	“goloyos”	(i.e.	literally	meaning	apprentice:	a	set	of	
young/emerging	 merchants	 making	 their	 living	 by	 doing	 so‐called	 “miscellaneous	 work”,	 which	
also	include	selling	“eerattu”	(law	value	gems)	in	the	secondary	market	on	behalf	the	merchant).	In	
all	means	gem	merchants	are	significant	economic,	political	and	social	actors	 in	 the	area	and	you	
wouldn’t	see	any	big	social	events	without	a	gem	merchant	being	 invited	as	a	“chief	guest”	or	the	
“guest	 of	 honour”:	 they	 sit	 in	 the	 same	 raw	 of	 chairs	 with	 the	 politicians	 and	 other	 leading	
government	 officers	 in	 the	 area.	 They	 are	 the	 linking	 pins	 between	 the	 field	 of	 gem	mining	 and	
various	other	economic	and	political	fields	in	the	area.	
	
Economic	inequality	in	the	gem	mining	towns	and	villages	is	apparently	very	high.	While	there	are	
very	 rich	 gem	merchants,	 there	 is	 also	 a	 large	 number	 of	 young	 unemployed.	 As	 school	 leavers	
(with	no	chance	of	entering	into	higher	education	due	to	very	limited	spaces	in	public	universities),	
these	unemployed	youths	make	up	 the	major	supply	of	 labour	 to	gem	mines.	Given	 the	gambling	
nature	of	gem‐mining	and	the	traditions	of	appropriating	the	surplus	value	(discussed	later),	only	a	
very	few	would	continue	to	stay	for	long	in	gem	mining	as	workers:	most	would	have	a	short	career	
as	a	worker	and	move	out	as	soon	as	they	find	an	opportunity	to	do	so.	Once	they	accumulate	an	
initial	capital	to	do	so,	many	would	try	their	luck	in	gem	trading	instead	of	gem	mining.	For	many	
“gem	mining	is	the	fool’s	luck”;	something	worth	enough	to	try	if	you	“have	no	options	but	to	toil	
the	muddy	soil	down	the	pit”	or	you	“have	enough	to	risk	a	bit	with	no	worries”.	A	gem	pit	therefore	
brings	together	people	at	these	two	extremes	of	capital	endowment.	
	
Investment	 in	a	 gem	mine	has	always	been	a	 collective	venture,	with	 the	 contribution	of	 various	
‘forms	of	capital’	(such	as	lands,	timber,	tools,	water	engine,	and	so	on.	This	is	more	elaborated	in	
forthcoming	 sections)	by	various	 actors	 in	 the	 town/village.	Nevertheless,	 gem	merchants	would	
always	have	an	upper	hand	in	the	final	appropriation	of	income	from	a	gem	mine,	especially	due	to	
their	contribution	of	multiple	forms	of	capital	and	also	due	to	their	engagement	in	the	gem	trading	
(discussed	later).	
	
5.	The	gem	pit:	a	ritualised	labour	process	
Contrary	to	the	structural	organisation	of	the	mining	industry	in	the	west	(see	Boyns	and	Edwards,	
1996;	 De	 Beelde,	 2000;	 Vent	 and	 Milne,	 1997,	 2000),	 gem	 mining	 in	 Sri	 Lanka	 has	 never	 been	
organised	 through	 ‘corporate	 entities’	 of	 any	 sort.	They	have	 always	been	 communal	 enterprises	
organised	 and	 coordinated	 via	 the	 patronage	 of	 social	 relations	 and	 social	 rituals	 in	 villages.	
However,	 as	 Choudhury	 (1988)	 argues,	 the	 absence	 of	 modern	 corporate	 apparatuses	 does	 not	
nullify	 the	 possibilities	 of	 studying	 accounting.	 Instead,	 it	 contains	 information	 on	 the	 particular	
contexts	within	which	modern	organisational	apparatuses,	 including	modern	forms	of	accounting,	
12 
 
are	 not	 socially	 assumed	 to	 be	 necessary	 and	 have	 never	 become	 institutionalised/embodied	
practices	within	 the	 social	 contexts	 of	 production.	 So,	 studying	what	 is	 there,	 instead	 of	modern	
forms	of	accounting,	will	give	us	the	opportunity	to	reveal	not	only	the	other	forms	of	accounting	
and	 control	 but	 also	 the	 structural	 conditions	 that	 facilitate	 or	 hinder	 the	 evolution	 of	 modern	
forms	of	accounting.	
	
Structural	conditions,	on	the	other	hand,	are	not	givens	and	would	not	necessarily	dictate	the	forms	
of	coordinating	economic	activities.	Every	field	of	production,	at	a	certain	phase	of	its	temporal	and	
spatial	 evolution,	 has	 a	 particular	 physical	 and	 technological	 nature	 beside	 its	 cultural	 grammar,	
and	that	particular	nature	would	have	a	significant	say	in	articulating	how	various	forms	of	capital	
are	mobilised	and	how	various	modes	of	coordination	and	control	are	deployed	for	its	governance.	
Gem	mining	 has	 a	 particular	 physical	 nature	 that	 renders	 it	 ‘a	 game	 of	 gambling’	 resulting	 in	 a	
particular	 form	 of	 structuring	 the	 field	 to	 diversify	 the	 stakes	 and	 the	 risk	 of	 the	 game	 among	 a	
spectrum	of	social	actors.	
	
The	physical	processes	of	gem	mining4	 involve	digging	a	deep	pit,	 approximately	12	x	12,	until	 a	
particular	 layer	of	 soil	 is	 found,	 called	 ‘illama’,	 an	 alluvial	 layer	of	 coarse,	pebbly	material,	which	
contains	traces	of	clay	and	fine	sand	where	gemstones	are	geologically	deposited.	Contrary	to	the	
gold	or	coal	mines	in	other	parts	of	the	world,	Sri	Lankan	gem	mines	are	not	land	intensive.	A	single	
gem	mine	would	need	a	maximum	of	10–15	perches5	of	land,	which	are	mostly	found	in	a	middle	of	
a	paddy	field,	and	co‐exist	with	paddy	farming.	In	wet	and	muddy	surroundings,	this	pit	often	goes	
as	 deep	as	50	yards	or	 so,	with	 carefully	 constructed	walls	 around	 it,	 and	wooden	 scaffolding	 to	
prevent	 the	walls	 of	 the	 pit	 from	 collapsing	 inwards.	 Once	 this	 particular	 layer	 of	 soil	 has	 been	
reached,	digging	continues,	making	horizontal	tunnels	parallel	with	that	special	layer	of	soil	“until	
the	 flame	of	 the	candle	 light	gets	weaker”	(customarily,	no	electric	or	battery‐powered	lighting	 is	
used;	the	weakening	flames	of	candles	are	used	as	a	measurement	of	 low	oxygen	levels	down	the	
pit).	The	purpose	of	digging	and	tunnelling	is	to	collect	as	much	‘illama’	as	possible,	because	it	is	the	
quantity6	of	this	special	soil	that	maximises	the	stakes	of	the	gamble	–	 finding	a	valuable	cache	of	
gems.	Once	the	illama	has	been	taken	to	the	surface,	it	is	piled	in	a	secure	place	near	the	pit	until	it	
can	be	washed	in	front	of	everyone	with	a	stake	in	the	gem	pit.	Illama	is	washed	in	a	large	circular	
wicker	basket	by	immersing	in	water	and	rotating	 it.	This	enables	the	 light,	ordinary	pebbles	and	
sediment	to	escape,	leaving	the	heavier	pebbles	behind.	Then	the	basket	is	held	against	the	sunlight	
and	carefully	scanned	for	gemstones.	
	
As	 “a	 set	 of	 historical	 relations	 ‘deposited’	 within	 individual	 bodies	 in	 the	 form	 of	 mental	 and	
corporeal	schemata	of	perception,	appreciation,	and	action”	(Bourdieu	and	Wacquant,	1992,	p.	16),	
relations	 in	 production	 are	 ritualistic	 and	 structured	 by	 a	 set	 of	 habitus	 and	 bodily	 hexis	 (see	
Bourdieu	and	Wacquant,	1992,	pp.	167–8).	Habitus	 is	a	practical	disposition,	which	explains	why	
social	practices	of	certain	classes	of	actors	are	characterised	by	regularities.	Habitus	is	a	property	of	
social	agents	and	it	is	“that	which	one	has	acquired,	but	which	has	become	durably	incorporated	in	
the	body	in	the	form	of	more	or	less	permanent	dispositions”	(Bourdieu,	1995,	p.	86).	It	is	a	“system	
of	structured,	structuring	disposition”	(Bourdieu,	1990b,	p.	52)	and	the	term	disposition	is	the	key	
                                                            
4		There	are	three	modes	of	gem	mining	in	Sri	Lanka:	deep	pit	mining	(gaburu pathal),	shallow	pit	mining	(goda pathal)	
and	river‐bed	pulling	(adum pathal).	Among	these,	deep	pit	mining	is	the	most	popular	and	largest	in	scale	in	terms	of	
operations	and	capital	requirements.	This	paper	mainly	concentrates	on	deep	pit	mining.	
5		‘Perch’	is	the	conventional	measurement	unit	of	land	in	the	field.	A	squire	perch	=	25.29	square	meters.	
6		Typically,	as	a	gem	pit	worker	explained,	“if	we	are	lucky	enough,	we	get	two	‘piles’	(up	to	the	height	of	a	grown	man	
and	a	diameter	of	around	10	feet	or	so)	of	illama.When	we	washed	them	all,	we	would	get	a	handful	of	‘stones’	[gems].	
If	 we	 are	 so	 lucky,	 they	 can	 all	 be	 nill [blue	 sapphire]	 or	 wairodi [cat’s	 eye],	 or	 they	 can	 just	 be	 all	 thorammali 
[semiprecious	gems	with	little	value	in	the	market]”.	
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to	 this	definition,	 since	 it	 suggests	 two	essential	 components	of	 the	 concept	of	habitus:	 structure	
and	 propensity	 (see	 Swartz,	 1997,	 p.	 103).	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 habitus	 becomes	 the	 dispositional	
means	 through	 which	 social	 actors,	 through	 their	 socialisation	 experiences,	 internalise	 external	
structures.	 Broad	 structural	 parameters	 and	 the	 boundaries	 of	what	 is	 possible	 or	 unlikely	 for	 a	
particular	group	of	social	actors	in	the	institutionalised	hierarchy	are	internalised	and	embedded	as	
dispositions	through	socialisation.	 In	 that	sense,	habitus	sets	structural	 limits	 for	actions	(Swartz,	
1997,	 p.	 103)	 and	 leads	 individuals	 to	 a	 “kind	 of	 immediate	 submission	 to	 order”.	 Habitus,	 thus,	
legitimates	 the	material	 and	 symbolic	 inequalities	by	providing	a	practical	 and	 taken‐for‐granted	
acceptance	of	 the	 fundamental	 conditions	of	existence	(Swartz,	1997,	p.	105).	On	 the	other	hand,	
habitus	 also	 implies	 that	 actors	 encounter	 and	 act	 upon	 the	 present	 in	 terms	 of	 previous	
experiences	that	they	have	embodied	through	socialisation.	As	such,	habitus	becomes	a	structuring	
structure,	that	is,	as	a	principle	of	the	generating	and	structuring	of	practices,	it	generates	strategies	
that	 can	 be	 objectively	 consistent	 with	 the	 material	 and	 symbolic	 interests	 of	 the	 social	 agents	
without	having	been	expressly	designed	to	that	end	(Free	and	Macintosh,	2009,	p.	11).	
	
Certainly,	 there	 are	 calculative	 and	 control	 implications	 of	 such	 work	 habitus,	 as	 they	 offer	 a	
cultural	 grammar	 for	 structuring	 day‐to‐day	work	 practices	 and	 negate	 the	 necessity	 for	 ‘other’	
forms	of	 accounting,	 planning	 and	 control.	 For	 example,	 a	 typical	 answer	 to	 the	question	of	 how	
many	workers	would	be	ideal	for	a	pit	was	“six	workers:	 in	rotation,	two	at	the	bottom	of	the	pit,	
two	at	the	top	to	pull	the	rope,	and	another	two	to	move	soil	on	and	off	the	pit	.	.	.	most	importantly,	
no	one	should	ever	be	down	in	the	pit	alone”.	Such	habitus	“is	a	product	of	history	which	produces	
individual	and	collective	practices.	It	ensures	the	active	presence	of	past	experience	which	tend	to	
guarantee	the	‘correctness’	of	practice,	and	their	constancy	over	time,	more	reliably	than	all	formal	
rules	and	explicit	norms”	(Harker	and	May,	1993,	p.	174).	However,	a	habitus	is	not	a	rigid	rule	or	
social	code	that	determines	the	actions.	Instead,	it	sets	the	boundaries	within	which	agents	exercise	
a	 relative	 freedom	 in	 adopting	 and	 adapting	 practices	 according	 to	 the	 “feel	 for	 the	 game”,	 as	
Bourdieu	calls	it,	which	is	“what	enables	an	infinite	number	of	‘moves’	to	be	made,	adapted	to	the	
infinite	 number	 of	 possible	 situations	 which	 no	 rule,	 however	 complex,	 can	 foresee”	 (Bourdieu,	
1990a,	p.	9).	They	do	not,	 in	a	practical	 sense,	necessarily	determine	actions	but	 orient	 them.	As	
Bourdieu	argues,		
	
modes	of	behaviour	created	by	the	habitus	do	not	have	the	 fine	regularity	of	 the	
modes	of	behaviour	deducted	from	a	legislative	principle:	the	habitus	goes	hand	in	
glove	with	vagueness	and	indeterminacy	(Bourdieu,	1990a,	p.	77).	
	
In	 our	 empirical	 context,	 for	 example,	 the	 habitus	 of	 six	 workers	 for	 a	 pit,	 though	 recursively	
referred	 to	 in	 conversations	 on	 planning	 the	 pit	 work,	 is	 vague	 and	 indeterminate.	 The	 actual	
number	 working	 on	 a	 particular	 pit,	 and	 how	 they	 organise	 the	 work	 between	 them,	 differs	 to	
reflect	 social	 conditions	 and	 the	 relations	 among	 the	 people	 in	 the	 working	 party.	 As	 one	 pit	
organiser	put	it:	
	
You	can	work	a	pit	with	six	workers,	and	that	would	be	the	ideal.	If	folks	working	
in	 the	 pit	 need	more	 than	 six	 in	 the	 gang,	 it	 is	 up	 to	 them.	 Sometimes,	 they	 of	
course	 have	more	 than	 six	 in	 their	 gang.	When	 one	 of	 their	 friends	 or	 relatives	
wants	 to	 join	 them	 they	 can’t	 simply	 say	no;	 they	would	be	happy	 to	 get	 him	 to	
work	with	them.	 It	affects	their	 income	not	mine	or	anybody	else	contributing	to	
the	 pit	 [because	 of	 the	 particular	 mechanism	 of	 appropriating	 the	 stake:	 see	
below].	Sometimes,	 they	are	even	 less	 than	six	and	anyhow	mange	the	work	but,	
for	their	own	safety,	they	should	always	make	sure	that	no	one,	however	good	and	
experienced	that	one	would	be,	should	ever	be	down	in	the	pit	on	his	own.	
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This	 vagueness	and	 indeterminacy	of	habitus	 facilitates	 the	agency	of	 social	 actors	 creating	 their	
own	social	space	relatively	free	from	external	pressures	and	controls.	The	result	 is	 less	alienation	
within	 the	 relations	 in	production	and	more	 freedom	to	exercise	 the	 collective	will	 of	 the	 labour	
force.	In	that	sense,	habituses	become	something	collective;	something	cultural	enough	to	penetrate	
the	 collective	 conscience	 that	 structures	 their	 dispositions	 on	 technicalities	 and	 the	 social	
relationships	at	work.	For	example,	 the	 following	quotation	 from	a	group	of	workers	exemplifies	
not	only	 this	 relative	 freedom	and	 the	collective	agency	of	 the	 labour	 force	 to	determine	 its	own	
conditions	but	also	how	the	“feel	for	the	game”	orients	their	actions	and	strategies.	
	
Many	pits	go	with	six,	but	we	got	eight	here	in	our	pit.	We	were	eight	for	so	long	
now	 and	 that	works	 very	well	 for	 us.	 However,	 KP	will	 leave	 the	 pit	 very	 soon,	
because	he	is	going	to	get	back	his	job	in	the	police	[he	had	been	suspended	on	an	
alleged	case	of	bribery].	Then,	we	may	continue	with	seven	or	someone	else	may	
join	us;	who	knows!	.	.	 .	We	learn	from	others	what	to	do	and	how	to	do	when	we	
start	work	in	a	pit	as	young	kids.	After	that,	nobody	would	tell	us	what	to	do	and	
how	 to	 do;	 everybody	 knows	what	 they	 need	 to	 do,	 and	 how	 to	 do	 them.	 Don’t	
they?	If	you	keep	on	asking	others	what	to	do,	you	become	an	idiot	and	they	will	
take	you	for	a	joke.	.	.	.	Everyday	work	is	not	the	same.	If	the	pit	is	too	full	[of	water]	
or	it	is	raining,	no	use	of	running	the	water‐pump.	You	just	waste	diesel.	We	can’t	
do	 any	 pit	 work,	 and	 we	 would	 prepare	 timber	 for	 the	 next	 day’s	 work	 or	 we	
would	just	sharpen	the	tools	and	clean	the	water	engine.	You	can’t	just	spend	the	
day	 doing	 nothing.	 Can	 you?	 .	 .	 .	What	we	 did	 few	months	 ago	 [i.e.,	 in	 the	 early	
phase	of	the	pit	work]	were	not	what	we	are	doing	now	[at	the	deep	digging	and	
tunnelling	stage].	We	hope,	with	the	blessing	of	the	god,	we	will	be	washing	a	big	
load	of	illama	before	‘new	year’	[the	festival	season]	.	.	.	Every	hour	or	so	we	would	
take	a	break	 for	a	 cup	of	 tea	and	a	smoke,	and	change	our	positions.	 .	 .	 .	When	a	
good	match	[cricket]	is	on	the	TV,	we	all	would	be	watching	it	and	no	work	at	all.	
Who	would	bother	to	work	then?	[Laughter].	
Embodimentof	 the	 field’s	 structural	 logic	 takes	a	 physical	or	 bodily	 form	as	well	 as	 amental	 one.	
Bourdieu	terms	this	bodily	dimension	of	embodiment	“bodily	hexis”.	It	is	the	bodily	manifestation	
of	a	permanent	disposition	–	a	durable	way	of	undertaking	certain	physical	acts	such	as	using	a	tool,	
standing,	 walking,	 speaking	 and,	 thereby,	 feeling	 and	 thinking	 (Bourdieu,	 1990b,	 pp.	 69–70).	
Similar	to	Foucault’s	“disciplinary	principles”,	especially	the	maneuver	(Foucault,	1979;	Macintosh,	
1994,	p.	224),	bodily	hexis	 is	 amode	of	disciplining	 the	body	 to	 realise	 the	 structural	 logic	of	 the	
field:	by	adopting	a	particular	set	of	bodily	hexis,	classes	of	actors	constitute	themselves	as	a	set	of	
disciplined	incumbents	in	the	field.	
	
As	observed,	the	labour	process	in	the	pit	was	neither	regimented	nor	subject	to	direct	supervision	
by	 anyone	 external	 to	 the	 labour	 gang.	 The	way	work	 is	 organised	 and	 carried	 out	 is	 left	 to	 the	
workers,	 but	 ritualised	 and	 structured	 by	 an	 explicit	 set	 of	 habitus	 and	 bodily	 hexis,	 such	 as:	
“Where	to	put	the	logs	on	the	pit	wall	is	always	decided	by	basunnah7	and	everybody	should	act	on	
                                                            
7			The	term	basunnah (Sinhalese)	refers	to	a	person	with	special	skills	in	carpentry	and	masonry.	In	the	context	of	gem	
mining	 this	 involves	 the	 special	 skills	 of	 wall	 building	with	 wooden	 logs	 and	 plants,	 a	 skill	 that	 would	 ultimately	
determine	the	safety	and	life	chances	of	all	mine	workers,	and	a	skill	that	one	would	accumulate	only	over	many	years	
of	experience	in	mining.	Thus,	this	has	always	been	a	cultural	capital	that	warrants	a	higher	stake	in	the	game	(at	least	
more	 than	 other	workers,	 see	 below).	 One	would	 become	 a	basunnah through	 accumulating	 this	 stock	 of	 cultural	
capital:	 working	 in	 gem	 pits	 for	 so	 long	 that	 guarantee	 others’	 acceptance	 of	 him	 as	 having	 the	 bodily	 hexis	 and	
habitus	of	a	basunnah.	For	some,	however,	this	is	nothing	else	but	his	“bad	karma	(pow)	 ...	too	much	of	him	making	
others	richer	but	him	yet	toiling	the	muddy	soil	down	the	pit”.	
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his	‘shout’	[a	form	of	giving	instructions	loudly	so	that	everybody	in	and	beyond	the	pit	can	hear	it	
and	 synchronise	 their	 individual	 acts]	 …	 young	 ones,	 until	 they	 catch	 the	 art	 of	 using	 it	 [i.e.	
according	 to	 the	 terminology	of	Bourdieu,	 this	means	until	 they	 accumulate	a	particular	 stock	of	
cultural	 capital],	 should	 use	 the	 vaya	 [a	 very	 sharp	 tool	 used	 to	 shape	wooden	 logs,	 which,	 if	 it	
misses	its	mark,	can	cause	severe	leg	injuries]	only	with	the	help	of	an	experienced	elder.”	Elderly	
workers	have	gained	an	“individual	trace	of	an	entire	collective	history”	(Bourdieu,	1990a,	p.	91),	
have	learnt	a	particular	set	of	bodily	hexis	and	habitus	that	spell	out	the	 ‘correct’	ways	of	using	a	
particular	tool	or	doing	a	particular	job.	They	pass	that	cultural	capital	to	the	younger	ones,	on	the	
one	hand,	as	one	of	their	social	responsibilities	and,	on	the	other,	in	gratitude	for	the	subordination	
and	obedience	of	 the	younger	members	of	 the	 group.	For	 younger	workers,	 learning	 such	bodily	
hexis	and	habitus	constitutes	exposure	to	the	mockery	of	making	mistakes,	the	punitive	element	of	
the	 learning	process	at	work,	and	also	 the	 joy	of	being	able	 to	do	 the	“hard	work	of	men”,	which	
promulgates	the	“possession	of	a	strong	body”.	Through	day‐to‐day	exposure,	with	their	own	ways	
of	reacting	and	responding	to	those	punitive	elements	of	social	learning,	individuals	trace	an	entire	
collective	history	of	working	in	a	gem	mine;	thus,	habitus	and	bodily	hexis	pass	on	to	individuals	as	
a	structured	and	structuring	structure	of	work.	
	
The	 social	 composition	 of	 the	 gang,	 especially	 the	 age	 structure	 and	 kinship	 relations	 within	 it,	
operates	as	the	disciplining	structure	at	work.	Assessment	of	the	speed	and	the	quality	of	the	work	
of	 an	 individual	 is	 naturally	 built	 into	 the	 collective	 work	 process,	 in	 that	 an	 individual’s	
sluggishness	would	slow	down	the	whole	process	and	he	would	soon	gain	attention	for	“correction	
through	mockery”.	That	said,	 structuring	of	work	as	a	 synchronised	action	between	 two	or	more	
interdependent	work	elements	(for	example,	 throwing	and	catching,	pulling	and	pushing,	holding	
and	hammering)	has	operated	as	a	physical	mode	of	coordination	as	well	as	control.	It	is	common	
to	see	conflicts	between	the	workers	in	the	gang.	They	often	arise	from	“making	too	much	mockery”	
of	a	weak	worker	(often	young	and	new	to	mining).	However,	such	conflicts	tend	to	be	temporary	
and	easily	resolved	by	the	 jurisdiction	of	an	elderly	worker	whose	presence	 in	 the	gang	acts	as	a	
referee.	Such	mockery	and	conflicts	constitute	the	natural	tone	(and	the	joy)	of	work	interactions.	
They	provide	 a	necessary	 ‘social’	 element	of	 the	work	 and	 transform	 the	day‐to‐day	 interactions	
into	 a	 sort	 of	 social	 game.	 At	 the	 micro	 level	 of	 social	 interactions	 in	 the	 gem	 pit,	 individuals,	
depending	upon	their	 individual	character	and	the	position	they	hold	within	the	workgroup,	play	
this	game	for	the	small	stake	of	winning	and	losing	a	particular	act	of	mockery,	or	just	for	the	self‐
satisfying	demonstration	of	their	‘bodily	ability’	to	perform	a	particularly	difficult	job	better	(or	not	
worse)	than	others.	In	essence,	social	relations	at	work	have	been	structured	into	game	playing,	the	
mastering	of	which	entails	the	embodiment	of	a	cultural	capital	within	individual	bodies,	at	least	to	
escape	the	punitive	elements	of	learning	the	trade	and,	at	best,	to	enhance	their	chance	of	upward	
mobility	within	 the	 social	 hierarchy.	 Playing	 the	 day‐to‐day	 game	 of	 social	 relations	 at	work	not	
only	 integrates	 individual	workers	 into	 the	 collective	disposition	of	work	but	 also	 structures	 the	
relations	 of	 accountability	 and	 control,	 where	 surrendering	 to	 the	 seniority	 and	 elderly	 kinship	
positions	has	always	been	a	doxic	attitude.	
	
Within	this	system	of	production,	the	documentation	of	worker	attendance,	resource	consumption	
or	 any	 other	 work	 related	 information	 was	 virtually	 absent.	 Detailed	 calculations	 of	 resource	
requirements,	 either	 for	 planning	 or	 control	 purposes,	 are	 deemed	 to	 be	 unnecessary,	 and	
calculations	 of	 costs	 or	 profits	 are	 not	 carried	 out.	 Detailed	 calculations,	 assessments	 and	
documentation	have	not	been	part	of	 the	 “practical	 logic”	of	 the	existing	 set	of	habitus,	doxa	and	
bodily	hexis	that	structure	work	practices.	The	need	for	quantifications	and	qualitative	assessments	
of	resource	requirements	(for	example,	wooden	logs	and	fuel	for	the	water	pump)	for	‘rationalised	
planning	 and	 control’	 (as	 assumed	 in	modern	 enterprises	 in	 western	 capitalism)	 does	 not	 arise	
because	of	 the	particular	 social	 contract	 to	which	various	 forms	of	 capital	 in	 the	 field	 enter	 (see	
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below).	Or,	 in	other	words,	formal	record	keeping	and	the	control	apparatuses	of	modernity	have	
not	yet	penetrated	practices	in	the	field	of	gem	mining.	Instead,	a	set	of	idiosyncratic	traditions	are	
in	place,	which	structure	the	day‐to‐day	practices	of	work	and	control.	
	
However,	 the	 absence	 of	 accounting	 and	 the	 relative	 freedom	 of	 labour	 from	 external	 controls,	
especially	of	other	dominant	 forms	of	capital,	are	not	 fully	explained	either	by	 the	 internal	 social	
organisation	of	labour	itself	(i.e.	relations	in	production)	nor	by	the	presence	of	a	set	of	habitus	and	
bodily	 hexis	 particular	 to	 the	 field	 of	 gem	 mining.	 The	 logic	 of	 absence	 of	 ‘formal’	 control	 and	
accounting	also	 lies	 in	the	particular	way	that	capital	 is	 formed	and	arranged	within	the	field	(i.e.	
relations	 of	 production).	 In	 the	next	 section,	 in	 the	 light	 of	 a	 set	 of	material	 practices	 associated	
with	valorisation,	I	will	discuss	the	field‐specific	 logic	of	capital	 formation	and	its	 implications	for	
calculative	and	control	practices.	
	
6.	The	auction:	calculations	and	logics	of	appropriation	
Social	systems	of	production	are	reproduced	by	field	logics	of	appropriation	that	structure	the	field	
capital	 to	 constitute	 structures	of	 inequality,	 domination,	 symbolic	power	 and	 symbolic	 violence.	
According	 to	 Bourdieu	 (1990a),	 a	 field	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 competitive	 game	 or	 “field	 of	
struggles”	in	which	social	agents	strategically	improvise	in	their	quest	to	maximize	their	positions	
articulated	by	the	relative	endowment	of	various	forms	of	capital	and	the	social	interests	attached	
to	those	varieties	of	capital.	That	said	“every	field,	as	a	historical	product,	generates	interests	which	
is	the	precondition	of	its	functioning”	(p.	88).	On	the	other	hand,	“the	existence	of	a	specialised	and	
relatively	autonomous	field	is	correlative	with	the	existence	of	specific	stakes	and	interests”	(p.	87).	
Thus,	 a	 field,	 as	 a	 terrain	 of	 gaming,	 is	 structured	 by	 a	 set	 of	 interests,	 stakes	 and	 investments,	
according	 to	which	 field	 incumbents	 struggle	 for	 the	maintenance	or	advancement	of	 their	 social	
positions	 through	 accumulation	 of	 various	 forms	 of	 capital.	 Turning	 our	 focus	 to	 calculative	
practices,	 as	 a	 distinctive	 set	 of	 social	 practices,	 particular	 forms	 of	 calculations	 can	 become	 the	
social	 logics	 through	which	 these	 field‐specific	 interests,	 stakes	 and	 investment	 propositions	 are	
articulated	as	the	field‐specific	logic	of	appropriations.	Implicit	and	embedded	in	these	calculations	
would	then	be	the	parameters	of	social	space	and	symbolic	power,	which	are	reproduced,	as	the	set	
of	 rules	 that	 govern	 the	 game,	 within	 practices	 of	 production	 and	 valorisation	 through	 various	
forms	of	calculations.	 Importantly,	particular	 forms	of	calculations	can	become	the	doxic	mode	of	
explicating	the	“rules	of	the	game”	that	determine	the	stake	of	each	social	actor	in	the	field.	
	
This	logic	of	calculative	practices	is	exemplified	by	the	way	that	the	gem	pit	is	resourced	and	how	
sales	proceeds	are	 appropriated.	Once	 the	 illama	 is	washed	and	 gems	 are	 found,	 they	are	 sorted	
into	 different	 “lots”	 according	 to	 their	 types.	 Wrapped	 in	 white	 tissue	 paper,	 they	 are	 then	
presented	 in	 the	 ‘pit	 auction’,	which	most	 of	 the	 area’s	 gem	merchants	 attend,	 except	 a	 few	 ‘big	
merchants’.	Having	carefully	examined	each	lot	of	gems	for	type,	quality	(mainly	purity	from	cracks	
and	 transparency	of	 light)	 and	size,	 each	merchant	puts	his	 bid	on	 a	piece	of	paper	 (the	 ‘auction	
chit’),	rolls	it	to	hide	the	writing,	and	puts	it	into	the	auction	basket.	Once	the	highest	bid	is	revealed	
at	the	end,	the	labour	gang	is	free	to	either	accept	or	reject	it.	If	they	think	that	they	can	find	a	better	
price	somewhere	else	(they	will	often	take	some	 ‘private	bids’	before	the	auction,	especially	from	
‘big	merchants’	who	would	 not	 normally	 attend	 such	 auctions	 because	 of	 their	 social	 status	 and	
reputation)	they	are	able	to	refuse	the	auction	price	and	sell	the	gems	out	of	auction.	
	
It	is	not	the	mere	process	and	the	rituals	of	the	gem	auction	but	the	calculations	embedded	in	the	
appropriation	 of	 auction	 proceeds	 that	 reveal	 not	 only	 the	 field	 logic	 of	 capital	 investments	 and	
accumulations	but	also	how	wider	social	hierarchies	are	reproduced	through	particular	calculative	
practices	at	the	point	of	production.	Once	the	final	sales	proceeds	of	the	gem	pit	are	determined,	a	
chart	(as	shown	in	Fig.	2,	which	also	shows	my	English	translations	superimposed	and	is	elaborated	
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in	Table	1)	is	prepared	to	show	the	“share”	of	various	modes	of	capital	that	define	the	field	of	gem	
mining.		
		
Fig.	2.	The	calculative	logic	of	appropriation	and	social	reproduction.	
	
	
The	 calculative	 logic	behind	 this	 chart	 is	 somewhat	doxic,	 a	product	of	 the	historical	 tradition	of	
gem	 mining.	 Distribution	 of	 auction	 money	 is	 almost	 identical	 in	 all	 instances	 in	 the	 area	 and	
follows	the	same	rank‐order	of	different	forms	of	capital	“leaving	the	labourers	only	with	smallest	
share”.	Only	minor	differences	can	be	seen	in	some	special	occasions.	An	example	of	such	a	minor	
difference	 is	where	 a	 gem	pit	 runs	without	 a	proper	 government	 licence	 to	do	 so,	 instead	of	 the	
“share	 of	 licence”,	 there	may	be	 “police	 panguwa”	 –	 the	police	 share,	which	 goes	 to	 the	 relevant	
police	officers	who	then	prevent	the	gem	pit	from	being	raided.	Similarly,	in	one	occasion,	workers	
decided	not	to	have	tea	from	any	other	party	and	therefore	avoided	a	“share	of	tea”	being	paid	out.	
The	 origin	 of	 these	 practices	 of	 appropriation	 cannot	 be	 traced	 and	 dates	 far	 back	 beyond	 the	
memory	of	many	 elderly	workers	 and	 gem	merchants:	 “as	 far	 as	 I	 remember,	 this	 is	 how	 it	was	
done	for	generations.”	Despite	its	origin	and	minor	differences	in	practices,	this	calculative	practice	
vividly	 illustrates	how	an	underlying	social	hierarchy	of	symbolic	power	and	symbolic	violence	 is	
relationally	 built	 into	 a	particular	 schema	of	 capital,	 and	how	 that	 social	 structure	 is	 reproduced	
within	the	calculative	practices	of	valorisation	through	a	particular	calculative	template.	
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Table	1:	Organisation	of	a	gem	pit:	capital	formation,	social	stratification	and	returns	
Form	of	capital		 Return	 Person	contributed	
Land:	Commitment	of	land	to	the	venture	until	it	
is	over.	Land	is	not	"sold"	to	the	venture	but	just	
"rented"	Land	would	normally	put	back	to	its	
ordinary	use	after	the	venture.			
First	1/5th of	the	auction	money	Rs.134,000 Mrs	K,	a	retired	school	teacher	and	her	
extended	family.		
Licence:	fees	and	expenses	incurred	to	obtain	the	
government	licence	for	gem	mining	in	the	given	
plot	of	land.		This	involves	a	certain	degree	of	
cultural	and	social	capital	as	well	in	terms	of	
contacting	and	getting	the	patronage	support	of	
relevant	government	officers	and	politicians.		
"you	need	a	bit	of	oiling	and	greasing	to	push	your	
application	through,	otherwise	it	will	never	pass	
some	officers	desk"	(a	comment	by	a	gem	
merchant).	
1/5th	of	the	remainder	of	the	auction	money	
after	the	share	of	land.		
Rs.	107,200	
	
	‘Mudalali’	P	(a	gem	merchant).		"I	got	people	
to	do	this	for	me,	I	just	need	to	throw	some	
money"	
(Mudalali	is	the	Singhalese	for	a	wealthy	
merchant,	also	works	as	a	word	of	honour).		
Water	engine	and	its	running	cost	(i.e.	diesel	and	
maintenance).		The	water	engine	goes	back	to	its	
owner	after	the	venture	and	he	would	normally	
continue	to	invest	it	in	another	venture.		
1/5th of	the	remainder	of	the	auction	money	
after	the	shares	of	land,	and	licence.		
Rs.	85,760	
Mr	P	(the	gem	merchant,	mentioned	above)
Timber:	wooden	logs,	strips	and	“kakilla”	(a	
special	plant	to	fill	the	gaps	between	logs	and	
strips	so	that	the	walls	would	not	collapse	into	the	
wood)	necessary	for	wall	building	in	the	pit.		
1/5th	of	the	remainder	of	the	auction	money	
after	the	shares	of	land,	licence,	and	water	
engine.		
Rs.	68,608	
Mr	R	(a	businessman	in	the	town,	not	a	gem	
merchant,	though	invested	in	a	few	gem	
mines)		
Tools:	supply	of	all	mining	tools	required	for	the	
pit,	except	for	water	engine	and	its	running	cost.		
All	these	tools,	if	in	good	conditions,	go	back	to	the	
owner	after	the	venture.		
1/5th	of	the	remainder	of	the	auction	money	
after	the	shares	of	land,	licence,	water	engine,	
and	timber.		
Rs.54,886	
KM	(the	headman	of	this	particular	pit).		
However,	it	is	not	always	necessary	that	the	
headman	should	provide	the	tools.	It	could	be	
from	anybody,	most	often	from	a	gem	
merchant)		
Tea:	tea	and	“something	to	eat”	(often	something	
like	sugar	buns,	curry	buns,	or	curry	rotti)	twice	a	
day	for	all	pit	workers.		
1/5th of	the	remainder	of	the	auction	money	
after	the	shares	of	land,	licence,	water	engine,	
timber,	and	tools.		
Rs.43,909	
Mr	P	(the	gem	merchant,	mentioned	above)
Headman's	labour:	the	most	experience	and	
respected	labourer	in	the	gang	and	deemed	to	
posses	the	skills	of	expertise	of	all	aspects	of	gem	
mining,	especially	correct	techniques	of	wall	
building.		
1/10th	of	the	remainder	of	the	auction	money	
after	the	shares	of	all	other	forms	of	capital	
except	labour.		
Rs.17,564	
KM	(mentioned	above)	
Labour:	8	pit	workers	in	this	pit.		Pit	workers	are	
not	paid	wages	for	their	work.		They	risk	their	
labour	for	a	potential	share	of	auction	money,	
which	accrues	only	if	gems	are	found.	However,	
they	on	their	own,	may	arrange	a	subsistence	
payment	called	“weekly	cash”	with	anybody	they	
wish.		
Share	of	work:	the	remainder	of	the	auction	money	after	the	shares	of	all	other	forms	of	capital,	
divided	equally	between	the	8	workers	involved	in	the	pit.		
Rs.19,759	for	each	worker.		
5	of	these	workers	have	arranged	subsistence	expenses	with	various	parties	in	the	town	and	
nearby	villages.		That	said	they	pay	half	of	their	share	(so	called	expense	half)	to	the	person	who	
had	been	paying	them	so	called	“weekly	cash”	during	the	venture.	Three	young	pit	workers,	who	
still	enjoyed	the	dependence	on	their	parents,	had	opted	not	to	go	for	weekly	cash	and	are	
getting	the	whole	“share	of	work”	
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Fig.	 2,	 further	 illustrated	 in	 Table	 1,	 shows	 a	 formula	 of	 appropriation	 to	 distribute	 the	 sales	
proceeds	 (the	 auction	money)	 among	 various	 forms	 of	 capital.	 Interestingly,	 this	 formula	would	
never	 be	discussed	or	 agreed	upon	 explicitly	 before	 the	 various	parties	 enter	 into	 a	 gem	mining	
venture	but	it	is	a	traditional	practice	that	everybody	in	the	field	is	supposed	to	know	and	accept,	
and	 applied	 with	 only	 very	 minor	 differences	 between	 different	 gem	 pits.	 According	 to	 this	
calculative	doxa,	 the	various	 forms	of	 capital	 invested	 in	a	 gem	pit	 are	 classified	and	ranked	 into	
seven	major	categories	(see	Table	1).	As	a	classificatory	schema,	this	formula	provides	a	calculative	
logic	of	structuring	the	field	capital	into	a	hierarchical	order	of	stake.	Thus,	land	is	always	placed	as	
the	top	most	form	of	capital	and	claims	the	first	one	fifth	of	the	auction	money.	All	other	forms	of	
capital	contributions,	as	a	gem	merchant	commented,	are	“appropriately	rewarded	according	to	the	
tradition”,	which	designates	the	relative	place	of	each	category	in	the	hierarchy	of	capital	which,	in	
turn,	 decides	 their	 relative	 return.	 Labour	 has	 always	 been	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 the	 ladder	 and	 can	
claim	only	what	is	left	after	other	forms	of	capital	has	appropriated	their	stakes	of	higher	order.	The	
‘share	of	work’	as	the	final	remainder	of	the	auction	money	is	equally	divided	among	the	workers	in	
the	pit.	
	
Gem	merchants’	 presence	within	 this	 schema	of	 capital	 is	 dominating.	They	would	 typically	 own	
more	 than	 one	 form	 of	 capital	 and	 reproduce	 their	 structural	 power	 by	 appropriating	 and	
reinvesting	 a	 bigger	 portion	 of	 the	 auction	 money.	 It	 should	 also	 be	 noted	 that	 a	 gem‐mining	
venture	is	organised	as	a	pure	“game	of	gambling”,8	where	different	players	assume	different	stakes	
and	 pool	 their	 capital	 for	 a	 collective	 return	 at	 the	 end	 of	 a	 single	 venture.	 The	 implicit	 social	
contract	is	such	that	each	player	agrees	to	contribute	one	or	more	of	the	above	categories	of	capital	
until	the	end	of	the	venture.	Terms	of	contract	are	implied	and	well	understood	as	a	set	of	habitus.	
For	example,	the	landowner	would	simply	offer	the	land	and	bear	no	further	expense	other	than	the	
relatively	 minor	 costs	 of	 performing	 the	 bahirawa	 puja	 (a	 ritual	 ceremony	 performed	 to	 ask	
permissions	from	the	gods	and	demons	believed	to	possess	the	land	and	its	precious	stones).	The	
one	who	claims	for	the	‘share	of	licence’	(normally	the	gem	merchant	who	initiates	and	organises	
the	venture)	should	bear	all	the	contingent	costs	of	obtaining	 the	government	licence	for	the	gem	
pit,	which	include	the	licence	fee	plus	all	“other	payments”	(bribes	and	gifts)	made	to	various	state	
officers	to	speed	up	the	process	and	to	clear	various	bureaucratic	bottlenecks.	Once	these	expenses	
have	been	incurred,	the	financial	commitments	of	the	licence	holder	and	the	landowners	are	over.	
On	the	other	hand,	the	social	commitments	of	the	contributors	of	the	water	pump	and	fuel,	timber,	
tools	and	tea	are	on‐going	and	should	be	supplied	as	required	by	the	pit	operations.	Although	there	
are	 no	 sophisticated	 calculations	 involved,	 the	 field	 actors	 have	 a	 ‘common	 sense’	 of	 resource	
consumption	by	the	pit	operations,	as	manifested	in	a	set	of	habitus	related	to	the	“correct	way	of	
doing	pit	work”,	 such	as	 “every	riyana	[a	doxic	unit	of	measurement	equivalent	 to	half	a	yard]	of	
digging	need	four	long	logs	and	8	short	logs	.	.	.	and	a	typical	gem	pit	in	this	area	needs	around	three	
tipper‐trucks	of	timber”	(which	 is	provided	by	the	relevant	party	on	a	piece‐meal	basis	as	the	pit	
work	progress,	mostly	 in	 three	occasions:	one	tipper‐truck	at	a	 time).	These	categories	of	mining	
capital	 are	 mainly	 economic	 and	 draw	 on	 the	 relative	 wealth	 of	 the	 people	 involved	 but	 also	
demonstrate	certain	features	of	social	and	cultural	capital,	 in	that	“everybody	just	can’t	come	and	
buy	our	fortune.	They	should	be	one	among	us	who	we	can	trust”,	said	a	gem	merchant.	That	said,	
                                                            
8  “It’s [gem mining] like playing ‘buruwa’ [a form of gambling popular among locals, with equal odds of 
winning and losing]. You never know what you get. You may be lucky enough and have a ‘good stone’ 
valuable enough to feed even your grandchildren. Or you can be so unlucky and lose everything you put 
into it and end up just washing up muddy soil for nothing. It all depends on your ‘paw pin’ [the balance of 
bad and good karmas] you did in this and previous lives”: (from a gem merchant on the fortunes of gem 
mining). 
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“getting	together	for	a	new	venture”	always	takes	place	through	prior	experience	and	other	social	
connections	that	make	them	suitable	to	“share	collective	fortunes	and	misfortunes”.	
	
Gem	mining	is	still	a	pre‐capitalistic	form	of	production	where	labour	is	not	sold	in	the	market	for	a	
wage	and	the	 labour	process	 is	not	subordinated	by	technologies	of	governance.	 In	 fact,	 labour	 is	
exposed	to	higher	risk	in	this	game	of	gambling	because,	as	illustrated	in	Fig.	2,	a	relatively	smaller	
amount	 of	 auction	 money	 is	 left	 after	 appropriating	 the	 shares	 of	 all	 other	 forms	 of	 capital.	
However,	there	is	a	particular	mechanism	that	labourers	(if	they	wish)	can	choose	to	minimise	risk	
and	 provide	 a	 consistent	 subsistence.	 They	 often	 negotiate	 for	 what	 is	 called	 ‘weekly	 cash’.	 A	
labourer	can	thus	arrange	with	someone	in	the	village,	often	a	government	servant	or	other	person	
with	a	relatively	higher	and	regular	income,	to	pay	him	a	definite	amount	of	money	every	week	for	
subsistence	(Rs.	200	at	the	time	of	the	fieldwork)	in	return	for	what	is	called	“expense	half”	(i.e.	half	
of	the	“share	of	work”).	In	our	example,	above,	the	“share	of	work”	was	Rs.	19,759	of	which	half	(Rs.	
9880)	was	paid	to	the	provider	of	these	weekly	cash	as	the	“expense	half”.	It	should	also	be	noted	
that	it	is	the	responsibility	of	individual	workers,	if	they	wish,	to	arrange	their	own	“expense	half”.	
	
In	 this	 way,	 the	 calculative	 template	 applied	 in	 the	 appropriation	 of	 auction	 money	 vividly	
demonstrates	how	a	wider	set	of	power	relations,	which	articulate	the	structural	dynamics	of	the	
field,	 is	 articulated	within	 a	 specific	 set	 of	material	 practices,	 and	 how	 such	wider	 structures	 of	
power	 are	 reproduced	 within	 the	 cognitive	 schema	 of	 social	 agents	 to	 make	 such	 structures	 of	
domination	and	exploitation	‘natural’.	The	theoretical	implications	of	this	empirical	account	will	be	
discussed	further	in	the	synthesis	and	conclusion	section	in	the	light	of	Bourdieu’s	logic	of	practice	
and	his	sociology	of	symbolic	forms.	However,	before	that,	a	discussion	on	‘absence	of	accounting’	
and	‘resistance’	would	fill	some	gaps	in	the	analysis	so	far.	
	
7.	Absence	of	accounting	
Gem	mining	in	Sri	Lanka	is	a	peculiar	case	of	“absence	of	accounting”	(Choudhury,	1988;	Catasús,	
2008;	 Jacobs	and	Kemp,	2002;	 Jayasinghe	 and	Thomas,	2009),	 as	we	know	 it	 elsewhere,	 and	 the	
presence	 of	 a	 peculiar	 form	 of	 accounting.	 The	 only	 form	 of	 ‘accounting’	 (in	 a	 broader	 sense)	
present	here	is	the	“sheet	of	appropriation”,	that	accounts	for	the	return	that	each	form	of	capital	to	
venture	is	 ‘traditionally’	entitled.	Thus,	the	gains	of	the	venture	are	only	cognised	and	understood	
in	terms	of	these	shares,	which	 is	 just	a	share	of	the	sale	proceeds	(auction	money)	rather	than	a	
calculated	profit/loss.	For	the	venture,	no	record	was	kept	regarding	how	much	money	was	spent	
on	tea,	 timber,	 tools	or	anything	else	 for	 that	matter.	The	venture	has	neither	been	defined	as	an	
accounting	 entity	 of	 any	 form	 nor	 has	 it	 gained	 a	 distinct	 structural	 separation	 from	 its	 social	
context,	a	status	that	firms	in	modernity	have	been	able	to	achieve.	That	said,	the	venture	is	defined	
not	in	any	accounting	sense	but	as	a	social	contract	into	which	each	form	of	capital	is	entered.	How	
much	each	form	of	capital	get	as	its	return	is	determined	neither	by	the	‘accounting	or	opportunity	
costs’	 of	 that	 capital	 nor	 by	 any	 costs	 and	 benefits	 attributed	 to	 the	 venture	 but	 by	 the	 relative	
positioning	of	each	form	of	capital	in	the	field	of	capital.	At	its	best,	according	to	the	nature	of	this	
social	contract,	the	notion	of	profit,	at	least	theoretically,	can	only	accrue	at	the	level	of	individual	
capital	providers.	For	example,	it	is	possible	that	a	timber	provider,	on	his	own,	can	keep	a	record	of	
all	 expenses	 that	 s/he	 incurred	 on	 a	 single	 venture	 and	 then	 compare	 it	 with	 his/her	 “share	 of	
auction	money”	to	calculate	his	individual	profit/loss.	This	could	even	be	the	case	of	all	other	‘forms	
of	capital’.	However,	according	to	my	field	observations,	neither	of	those	capital	providers	bothers	
to	calculate	such	a	profit.	The	“share	of	auction	money”	instead	seems	to	work	as	an	assessment	of	
their	‘pow‐pin’	(the	balance	between	good	and	bad	karma).	As	a	gem	merchant	who	claims	for	the	
share	of	tea,	timber	and	also	the	licence	in	a	particular	gem	mine	commented:	
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“I	have	told	Hamzudin	(owner	of	a	tea	shop	in	the	Rakwana	town)	to	provide	the	
guys	with	 tea	 and	 buns	 or	 something	 else	 enough	 for	 eight	 people	 twice	 a	 day.	
Once	a	week	or	so,	I	settle	my	owes	with	Hamzudin.	…	No,	I	don’t	keep	a	record	of	
them.	…	Profit?.	…	Yes,	 I	 have	been	making	 good	money;	 you	 can	 see	 that.	 Can’t	
you?	(he	looks	around	to	take	my	attention	to	his	stock	of	luxurious	furniture	and	
the	big	house).	Everybody	knows	that	all	these	are	gem	money.	…	If	you	put	your	
money	in	a	mine,	you	don’t	know	what	you	get,	you	will	get	what	you	are	destined	
to	get.	So,	just	spend	your	money	on	what	you	are	supposed	to	do,	beyond	that	it	is	
not	 for	 us	 but	 for	 the	 God	 Saman	 (the	 patron	 god	 of	 Sabaragamuwa,	 the	 gem	
mining	province).	…	Thanks	god,	I	of	course	manage	without	books,	don’t	I?	I	got	
many	things	that	I	have	never	dreamed	of	before!”	
	
So,	the	question	is	“Why	is	there	no	accounting	here?”	(Choudhury,	1988,	p.	549;	see	also	Catasús,	
2008,	 p.	 1007).	 In	 this	 empirical	 case	 at	 least,	 the	 answer	 lies	 in	 the	 ideological	 and	 structural	
apparatuses	of	 the	 field	and	the	historical	construction	of	 the	economic	activity	as	a	 field	specific	
game,	 rather	 than	 in	 the	 “performative”	 and/or	 “ostensive”	 aspects	 of	 accounting	 (see	 Catasús,	
2008).	 In	other	words,	 the	 substantive	rationale	of	 the	absence	of	 accounting	 is	explained	not	 so	
much	 by	 ostensive	 or	 performative	 aspects	 of	 what	 is	 absent,	 but	 rather	 by	 the	 structural	 and	
practical	 logics	 of	 the	 field	within	which	 accounting	 is	 not	 deemed	 to	 be	 necessary	 (“I	 of	 course	
manage	without	records,	don’t	I?”).	
	
Historically	the	field	of	gem	mining	has	been	constructed	as	a	“game	of	gambling”	where	each	form	
of	 capital	 takes	 its	 own	 stake	 against	 the	 odds	 of	 the	 nature	 (i.e.	 natural	 possibility	 of	 finding	 a	
valuable	gem	articulated	in	terms	of	religious	ideologies),	and	it	is	this	doxic	ideology	of	gem	mining	
as	a	collective	(and	individual)	gamble	that	negate	record	keeping	as	a	practice,	at	least	at	the	level	
of	 individual	capital	providers.	By	 its	very	nature,	venture	outcomes	(finding	a	valuable	gem)	has	
not	 been	 understood	 to	 have	 any	 causal	 connections	 with	 capital	 invested;	 instead	 the	 venture	
outcomes	are	ideologically	related	to	the	collective	(and	individual)	karma	(paw‐pin)	or	luck.	Thus,	
investment	 and	 practices	 of	 gem	 mining	 are	 not	 driven	 by	 any	 ideology	 of	 profit	 or	 any	 other	
economic	measures	of	efficiency	that	demands	practices	of	record	keeping	and	comparing	costs	and	
revenues.	Behind	this	non‐economism	embedded	in	the	absence	of	accounting,	there	lies	the	non‐
secular	acceptance	of	uncontrollability	of	one’s	destiny.	
	
Apart	from	these	ideological	conditions,	there	also	exists	a	set	of	structural	conditions	that	negates	
the	presence	of	accounting	beyond	the	“sheet	of	appropriations”.	Still	in	the	form	of	a	pre‐modern	
economic	enterprise	characterised	by	rentier	capital9	relations,	gem	mining,	on	the	other	hand,	has	
not	yet	gained	a	distinct	 ‘organisational	boundary	and	a	structure’	within	which	class	distinctions	
are	 institutionalised	as	a	mode	of	production.	Ostensive	and	performative	dimensions	of	modern	
accounting	pre‐requires	such	a	mode	of	production	which	is	still	absent	in	Sri	Lankan	gem	mining.	
Instead,	field	is	structured	as	a	series	of	economic	ventures	that	a	selected	set	of	social	actors	enters	
into	through	their	social	relations	that	pre	(and	post)	exist	a	particular	venture.	Thus,	in	contrary	to	
a	western	mine,	 gem	mines	 in	 Sri	 Lanka	have	no	 structural	prerogatives	 to	 instigate	a	 system	of	
                                                            
9	The	gem	pit	or	the	venture	does	not	“buy”	any	of	these	capitals.	Neither	a	particular	form	of	dominant	capital	“buy”	the	
other	forms	of	capital	assuming	a	role	of	entrepreneurship,	as	it	is	commonly	assumed	in	western	economics.	Instead	
they	all	pool	together	for	the	particular	gem	pit	as	a	single	venture.	After	the	venture,	for	example,	the	land	is	still	with	
the	 land	owners	 (which	s/he	may	put	 it	back	to	other	uses),	 the	water	engine	and	 tools	are	still	with	 their	owners	
(which	they	often	provide	to	a	new	venture).	Those	who	offer	labour,	tea,	timber,	and	expense	half	(working	capital	
providers,	in	the	accounting	jargon	I	learnt	from	the	West)	are	the	parties	with	no	residual	value	of	their	capital	but	
only	the	relevant	share	of	auction	money.	
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accounting	 therein.	They	are	structured	and	governed,	on	 the	one	hand,	 through	power	relations	
that	extend	beyond	the	gem	mine	into	the	patronage	power	relations	in	the	society.	Within	such	a	
wider	set	of	power	relations,	the	existing	form	of	accounting,	the	“sheet	of	appropriation”,	function	
as	 the	 symbolic	 means	 through	 which	 structural	 properties	 of	 the	 field	 are	 cognised,	
communicated,	reproduced	and	transformed	into	a	set	of	practical	dispositions	that	orient	day‐to‐
day	work	practices,	domination	and	resistance.	
	
On	the	other	hand,	as	we	discussed	earlier,	the	labour	process	is	ritualistic	and	structured	by	a	set	
of	 habitus	 and	bodily	 hexis.	 Ritualistic	 organisation	 of	 labour	process	 in	 this	way	 is,	 therefore,	 a	
very	 strong	hegemonic	 form	of	 subsumption,	 although	 it	may	not	 qualify	 as	 real	 subsumption	of	
labour	(see	Marx,	1976,	p.	1021;	and	also	Burawoy,	1979,	p.	15).	As	far	as	there	is	a	field	specific	
calculative	mechanism	to	exploit	its	surplus	value	by	the	dominating	forms	of	capital,	and	as	far	as	
there	 is	 no	 “labour	 aristocracy”	 (Moorhouse,	 1978)	 to	 dominate	 the	 field	 specific	 logic	 of	
appropriation,	there	exists	no	real	necessity	 for	other	forms	of	accounting,	especially	those	forms	
through	 which	 real	 subordination	 is	 achieved	 in	 its	 Western	 counterparts.	 Instead,	 the	 habitus	
establishes	a	particular	form	of	accounting	as	represented	by	the	“rules	of	the	game”.	
	
8.	Domination,	subjugation	and	resistance	
The	 discussion	 so	 far	 revealed	 that	 the	 field	 of	 gem	 mining	 and	 gem	 pit	 operations	 have	 been	
structured	as	a	dominating	structure	through	a	set	of	habitus,	doxa,	bodily	hexis,	and	a	particular	
calculative	template	that	translates	the	relative	positioning	of	different	forms	of	capital	into	a	set	of	
practical	dispositions	of	appropriating	field’s	surplus	value.	As	structuring	structures,	these	forms	
of	embodiments	and	forms	of	capital	structure	the	field	into	a	social	space	within	which	symbolic	
violence	 by	 a	 dominating	 form	 of	 capital	 ismadepossible.	 However,	 such	 a	 dominating	 structure	
should	 not	 be	 conceptualised	 as	 a	 whole	 encompassing	 structure	 of	 domination	 that	 leaves	 no	
space	for	resistance	by	the	subalterns.	Instead,	a	 field	should	be	understood	as	a	structure	within	
which	even	the	subaltern	social	actors	do	enjoy	an	agency	of	strategising	and	resisting.	That’s	why	
Bourdieu’s	 reflexive	 sociology	 conceives	 a	 field	 as	 a	 ‘game’:	 a	 structural	 frame	 for	 interaction	
between	conflicting	actors	and	their	interests	providing	a	political	space	for	actors	to	strategise	and	
resist.	 However,	within	 such	 a	 dominating	 structure,	 resistance	mostly	 take	 place	 in	 the	 form	 of	
what	Scott	(1985,	1990,	see	also	Alawattage	and	Wickramasinghe,	2009)	calls	“everyday	forms	of	
resistance”	or	“hidden	transcripts”:	
	
“the	prosaic	but	constant	struggles	between	the	peasantry	and	those	who	seek	to	
extract	labour,	food,	taxes,	rents,	and	interests	from	them.	Most	of	the	forms	of	this	
struggle	 takes	 stop	well	 short	of	 collective	outright	defiance	 ...	 and	 they	 typically	
avoid	 any	 direct	 symbolic	 confrontation	 with	 authority	 or	 elite	 norms”	 (Scott,	
1985,	p.	29).	
	
As	such,	they	are	not	collective	forms	of	resistance	and	I	could	not	find	any	instances	(or	any	story	
of	 such	 an	 instance)	 of	 collective	 engagement	 of	 labour	 to	 steal	 gems	 from	 the	 pit	 or	 any	 other	
forms	 of	 collective	 defiance	 of	 the	 existing	 relations	 of	 production	 in	 the	 field.	 Furthermore,	 it	
appears	 that	 “stealing	 from	our	own	pit”	does	not	make	any	sense	 for	 them	 in	a	 collective	 sense.	
Nevertheless,	there	are	ample	‘stories’	of	individual	defiance	of	this	collective	doxa	despite	the	very	
high	risk	involved	in	such	an	attempt.	As	one	worker	commented,	
	
“yes	 if	 you	 are	 very	 very	 lucky,	 and	 so	 clever	 to	 hide	 it,	 you	 find	 a	 chance	 to	
smuggle	 a	 gem	 while	 working	 in	 the	 bottom	 of	 the	 pit,	 but	 you	 never	 get	 that	
chance	when	you	are	washing	the	illama	in	front	of	everybody.	If	you	smuggle	one,	
keep	 it	 for	 so	 long,	many	 years,	 before	 trying	 to	 sell	 it.	 Otherwise,	 you	will	 lose	
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your	friends,	and	may	even	lose	your	life	as	what	happened	to	D	(a	gem	pit	worker	
found	dead	in	a	gem	pit)”	
	
The	 most	 apparent	 and	 obvious	 form	 of	 resistance	 to	 the	 structural	 logics	 of	 domination	 and	
subjugation	 is	 to	 leave	 the	 game	 altogether.	 Majority	 of	 those	 who	 enter	 the	 field	 as	 workers	
(mainly	school	leavers)	leave	it	as	soon	as	they	find	something	else.	As	a	headman	(too	old	to	join	
the	Army	perhaps)	once	commented,	“It	is	increasingly	becoming	difficult	to	organise	a	work	gang,	
because	everybody	now	joins	the	Army10.		Many	die	in	the	war	but	at	least	their	children	or	parents	
get	their	salary	until	they	live”.	
	
Resistance	can	also	be	 seen	 in	 the	 form	of	an	alternative	 form	of	organising	a	gem	pit	venture:	a	
structural	alternative.	These	are	called	“hora	patal”:	illicit	shallow	pits	often	run	solely	by	a	gang	of	
workers	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 government	 forests	 without	 a	 licence	 and	 without	 contributions	 from	
other	forms	of	capital.	This	is	possible	mainly	due	to	the	shallowness	of	the	gem	pit	and	consequent	
simplicity	of	the	pit	operations	in	terms	of	resource	requirements.	Although	possibility	of	finding	a	
gem	is	lower	in	this	sort	of	gem	pits	than	in	the	deep	pit	mining,	and	although	there	is	a	high	risk	of	
“police	raids,	physical	injuries	from	police	beatings,	imprisonment	and	fines”,	there	is	an	increasing	
tendency,	especially	of	young	school	leavers,	to	engage	in	these	alternative	forms	of	gem	mining.	As	
a	gem	merchant	commented	(not	in	a	negative	or	complaining	but	rather	in	a	philosophising	tone):	
	
“Some	young	guys	would	find	some	tools,	collect	some	foods	enough	for	a	week	or	
so,	disappear	into	the	forest	and	may	return	with	a	good	lot	of	gems,	or	may	return	
empty	handed,	or	 even	end	up	 in	 the	 jail	 for	 six	months.	They	don’t	 care.	 ...	 Yes,	
they	should	try	their	luck	in	the	jungle	and	would	bring	us	some	gems	if	they	find	
them”11	
	
The	point	bringing	the	resistance	to	discussion	here	is	that	although	calculative	templates,	habitus,	
bodily	 hexis	 and	 doxa,	 should	 be	 understood	 as	 ‘structuring	 structures’	 they	 should	 never	 be	
understood	 as	 whole	 encompassing	 structures	 of	 domination.	 They	 always	 leave	 ample	
opportunities	for	prosaic	 forms	of	resistance	that	make	the	field	always	an	imperfect	structure	of	
domination	and	subjugation.	It	is	this	imperfection	of	the	game	that	always	makes	a	particular	field	
historically	dynamic.	
	
9.	Synthesis	and	conclusions:	logic	of	calculative	practices	
So	 far,	 in	 the	 empirical	 sections	 above,	 I	 have	 discussed	 how	 a	 set	 of	 field‐specific	 habitus	 has	
structured	the	presence	of	calculative	and	control	practices	of	some	kinds	and	the	absence	of	other	
kinds.	 However,	 this	 does	 not	mean	 that	 the	 social	 logic	 of	 the	 presence	 and	 absence	 of	 various	
calculative	and	control	practices	can	be	fully	explained	by	the	mere	empirical	specification	of	such	
habitus.	 Instead,	 an	empirical	 account	of	 habitus	 in	 a	 given	 field	of	production	would	provide	an	
insight	into	“what	gives	practices	their	relative	autonomy	with	respect	to	external	determinations	
of	the	immediate	present”	(Bourdieu,	1990b,	p.	56).	Such	an	empirical	account	would	also	explain	
                                                            
10	During	the	time	of	fieldwork,	the	country	was	in	the	middle	of	a	civil	war	with	separatist	Tamil	Tigers	of	the	northern	
part	 of	 the	 country.	 The	 Government	 Army	 was	 in	 a	 shortage	 of	 soldiers	 and	 provided	 the	 largest	 source	 of	
employment	for	unemployed	youths	in	the	poverty	laden	villages	and	a	bare	minimum	education	of	up	to	grade	6	was	
more	than	enough	to	be	a	soldier	and	earn	a	permanent	income.	
11	 One	 important	 thing	 that	 gem	 merchants	 establish	 before	 buying	 a	 gem	 is	 its	 source.	 As	 such	 it	 is	 difficult	 and	
dangerous	to	sell	a	‘stolen	gem’.	However,	merchants	are	more	than	ready	to	buy	gems	from	“hora‐patal”.	Illegal	gem‐
mining	is	a	‘state	imposition’	for	which	field	actors	have	little	respect.	As	far	as	the	illegal	gem	miners	can	handle	the	
police	raids	of	their	mines,	selling	a	gem	from	a	illegal	mine	is	not	a	problem	in	the	field.	This	means,	there	is	no	field	
definition	of	‘illegal‐gems’	but	‘illegal	gem	pits’.	
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how	habitus,	as	“a	past	which	survives	in	the	present	and	tends	to	perpetuate	itself	into	the	future	
by	making	itself	present	in	practices	structured	according	to	its	principles”	(Bourdieu,	1977,	p.	82),	
offers	a	set	of	schemes	of	perception,	cognition,	evaluation,	classification,	and	also	motor	patterns	
and	 performative	 routines,	 which	 “[tend]	 to	 guarantee	 the	 ‘correctness’	 of	 practices,	 and	 their	
constancy	over	time,	more	reliably	than	formal	rules	and	explicit	norms”	(Harker	and	May,	1993,	p.	
174).	 Such	 an	 empirical	 account	 on	 its	 own,	 however,	 would	 not	 reveal	 the	 ‘deep	 structures’	 of	
domination	and	subordination	 in	 social	 life,	alongside	which	 the	 logic	of	 calculative	practices	can	
better	be	understood.	Thus,	calculative	and	control	practices,	according	to	Bourdieu’s	(1990b)	logic	
of	practice,		
	
cannot	 be	 deuced	 either	 from	 the	 present	 conditions	 which	 may	 seem	 to	 have	
provoked	 them	or	 from	 the	 past	 conditions	which	have	produced	 the	habitus.	 ...	
They	can	therefore	only	be	accounted	for	by	relating	the	social	conditions	in	which	
the	habitus	that	generated	them	was	constituted,	to	the	social	conditions	in	which	
it	is	implemented	(p.	56).	
	
This	 means	 that	 practices	 are	 products	 of	 dispositions	 intersecting	 with	 the	 dynamics	 and	
structures	 of	 a	 particular	 field,	 and	 practices	 reflect	 the	 structure	 of	 that	 encounter.	 This	
relationship	is	dialectical	and,	hence,	calls	for	analyses	of	both	(1)	the	structure	of	the	relevant	field	
in	terms	of	its	power	relations	and	(2)	the	habitus	of	the	agents	involved	in	the	field	(Swartz,	1997,	
p.	 141).	 In	 one	 of	 his	 classic	 works,	 Distinction	 (Bourdieu,	 1984,	 p.	 101),	 Bourdieu	 formulates	
following	equation	to	summarise	this	dialectical	logic	of	practices:	
	
[(habitus)(capital)]	+	field	=	practice	
	
This	 equation	 highlights	 the	 interlocking	 nature	 of	 habitus,	 capital	 and	 field	 and	 their	 dialectical	
construction	of	practices	as	well	as	the	epistemological	centrality	of	practices	in	the	articulation	of	
deep	cognitive	and	social	structures	that	underlie	the	practices	pertaining	to	a	particular	field.	Thus	
the	 field	 logic	 of	 practices	 and	 an	 analysis	 of	 field,	 according	 to	 Bourdieu’s	 reflexive	 sociology	
(Bourdieu	and	Wacquant,	1992,	pp.	104–105),	 involves	 three	necessary	and	 internally	 connected	
moments:	analysis	of	the	positions	of	field	vis‐à‐vis	the	field	of	power	(i.e.	the	current	state	of	the	
field);	mapping	out	the	objective	structure	of	the	relations	between	the	positions	occupied	by	the	
agents	 or	 institutions	 who	 compete	 for	 the	 legitimate	 forms	 of	 domination,	 control	 and	
appropriations	(i.e.	forms	of	capital);	and	analyses	of	the	different	systems	of	dispositions	(habitus,	
bodily	hexis	and	doxa)	that	the	agents	of	a	field	have	acquired	through	internalising	a	determinate	
type	 of	 social	 and	 economic	 condition.	 However,	 the	 structured	 systems	 of	 practices	 (related	 to	
field	 and	 capital),	 expressions	 and	 dispositions	 of	 agents	 are	 methodologically	 inseparable	 and	
must	be	analysed	together	(Bourdieu	and	Wacquant,	1992,	p.	105).	
	
Coming	 back	 to	 our	 empirical	 case	 with	 this	 theoretical	 and	 analytical	 insight,	 the	 particular	
calculative	 practice	 of	 appropriating	 auction	 money	 is	 a	 product	 of	 this	 dialectic	 intercourse	
between	 the	 field	 structure	 of	 capital	 and	 the	 cognitive	 structures	 of	 its	 agents.	 As	 a	 form	 of	
institutionalised	practice,	this	calculative	template	of	appropriations	(see	Fig.	2)	demonstrates	how	
the	field	is	structured	according	to	the	relative	positioning	of	various	categories	of	capital.	Thus,	the	
social	 order	within	which	 gem	mining	 is	 conditioned	 is	 a	 dominating	 structure	 of	 hierarchically	
differentiated	categories	of	resources	which,	for	Bourdieu	(1991b,	p.	230),	are	capital	because	they	
function	 as	 the	 “social	 relation	 of	 power	 ...	 over	 the	 accumulated	 product	 of	 past	 labour	 .	 .	 .	 and	
thereby	over	the	mechanisms	which	tend	to	ensure	the	production	of	a	particular	category	of	goods	
and	thus	over	a	set	of	revenues	and	profits.”	The	hierarchical	stratification	of	capital	manifested	by	
this	particular	calculative	practice	is	internally	connected	to	the	wider	relations	of	power	operating	
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in	 and	 beyond	 the	 field	 of	 gem	mining,	 and	within	 the	 cultural	 political	 economy	 of	 Sri	 Lankan	
village	landscape.	That	said,	the	power	of	land	owners	and	gem	merchants	to	appropriate	a	larger	
proportion	 of	 the	 auction	 money	 over	 other	 forms	 of	 capital	 (including	 labour)	 stems	 from	 the	
embodiment	 of	 the	 social	 order	 (i.e.	 the	 field	 of	 power)	 manifested	 by	 historically	 accumulated	
economic	 capital	 (such	 as	 possession	 of	 financial	 capital,	 big	 houses,	 automobiles,	 and	 other	
symbols	of	wealth	and	power),	patronage	relations	and	other	forms	of	social	capital	(relations	with	
government	officers,	for	example)	within	a	set	of	habitus	and	related	calculative	practices.	
	
In	 this	way	 calculative	practices	 and	 templates	become	 instruments	of	 symbolic	manipulation	or	
symbolic	 forms	and	processes	that	reproduce	social	 inequalities.	As	already	noted,	such	symbolic	
systems	 simultaneously	 perform	 three	 interrelated	 but	 distinct	 functions:	 structuring	 structures	
(cognition),	 structured	 structures	 (communication)	 and	 instruments	 of	 domination	 (social	
differentiation).	
	
Calculative	 templates	 and	 procedures,	 as	 ‘structuring	 structures’,	 are	 instruments	 for	 knowledge	
and	 gnoseological	 construction	 of	 objective	 world;	 they	 are	 ameans	 by	 which	 to	 order	 and	
understand	 the	social	world.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	calculative	 template	used	 in	appropriating	auction	
money	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 technical	means	 of	 calculating	 the	 stake	 of	 each	 category	 of	 capital	 but	 a	
structuring	structure.	It	exerts	a	structuring	power	to	construct	reality,	which	tends	to	establish	a	
gnoseological	order	of	the	social	world	(see	Bourdieu,	1979,	p.	79).	Such	symbolic	systems	are	also	
‘structured	 structures’,	 whose	 internal	 logic	 channels	 deep	 structural	 meaning	 shared	 by	 all	
members	of	 a	 field.	As	 conceptual	 systems,	 such	 calculative	 templates	 and	procedures,	 therefore,	
function	 simultaneously	 as	 instruments	 of	 communication	 and	 as	 instruments	 of	 knowledge	
(Swartz,	 1997,	 p.	 83),	 and	 they	 are	 the	 “instruments	 par	 excellence	 of	 social	 integration:	 as	
instruments	of	 communication	and	knowledge	 they	make	possible	 the	consensus	on	 the	 sense	of	
the	 social	 world	which	makes	 a	 fundamental	 contribution	 toward	 reproducing	 the	 social	 order”	
(Bourdieu,	 1979,	 p.	 79).	 Thus,	 the	 sheet	 showing	 the	 appropriation	 of	 auction	 money	 not	 only	
constructs	a	gnoseological	structure	of	the	field	as	an	integration	of	the	interests	of	differentiated	
categories	of	capital	but	also	contributes	towards	a	homogeneous	conception	of	 the	game	of	gem	
mining	 as	 a	 collective	 venture	 (against	 the	 nature	 and	 the	 will	 of	 gods	 and	 demons)	 with	 a	
distinctive	stake	for	each	category	of	capital.	
	
According	to	Bourdieu	(1979,	p.	80),	symbolic	systems,	as	structured	and	structuring	instruments,	
fulfil	 their	 political	 function	 as	 instruments	 that	 legitimate	 domination.	 They	 help	 to	 ensure	 the	
domination	of	one	class	of	capital	over	others,	and	lead,	in	Weberian	terms,	to	the	‘domestication	of	
the	 dominated’.	 In	 other	 words,	 calculative	 templates	 and	 procedures,	 as	 symbolic	 systems,	
legitimate	social	ranking	by	encouraging	the	dominated	to	accept	the	existing	hierarchies	of	social	
distinction.	For	example,	in	our	empirical	case,	none	of	the	pit	workers	ever	complained	about	the	
apparent	 ‘discrepancies’	 in	 the	appropriation	of	auction	money	but	 took	 it	 for	granted	 that	 there	
was	no	problem	with	the	system	as	it	stood;	it	is	the	way	it	has	always	been	and,	therefore,	should	
always	be.	They	believe,	for	the	future,	that	“depending	on	our	own	karma	and	wise	investment	of	
whatever	 the	money	we	 receive,	 we	 can	 be	 gem	merchants;	 many	 of	 those	 big	merchants	 have	
started	 like	 us”.	 The	 social	 hierarchy	 that	 was	 apprehended,	 communicated	 and	 reproduced	
through	symbolic	systems	of	calculations	has	been	internalised	as	a	legitimate	system	that	provides	
everyone	 with	 fair	 opportunities	 for	 progress	 over	 the	 social	 hierarchy	 by	 transforming	 their	
current	labour	power	(one	form	of	capital)	into	other	forms	of	capital	with	a	higher	symbolic	power	
of	appropriation.	Bourdieu	calls	 this	 form	of	domination,	 or	 legitimation	of	domination,	 symbolic	
violence	 which,	 in	 contrast	 to	 overt	 violence,	 is	 gentle,	 invisible	 violence,	 unrecognised	 as	 such,	
chosen	as	much	as	undergone,	that	of	trust,	obligation,	personal	loyalty	(to	patrons	as	well	as	to	the	
system)	...	of	all	the	virtues	honoured	by	the	ethic	of	honour	(Bourdieu,	1990b,	p.	127).	
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These	 cognitive,	 communicative	and	dominating	powers	of	 calculative	 templates	and	procedures,	
however,	 do	 not	 occur	 in	 the	 form	 of	 an	 ‘illocutionary	 force’	 but	 are	 defined	 in	 and	 by	 the	 very	
structure	of	 the	 field	within	which	beliefs	 are	produced	and	 reproduced	 (Bourdieu,	 1979,	 p.	83).	
Thus,	there	is	an	inseparable	dialectic	between	calculative	practices	and	the	structures	of	the	field:	
calculative	templates	and	procedures,	on	the	one	hand,	are	products	of	the	structural	configuration	
of	the	relevant	field	in	a	particular	temporal	and	spatial	phase	of	evolution	and,	on	the	other,	are	the	
symbolic	means	through	which	the	same	structural	configuration	is	understood,	communicated	and	
reproduced.	 That	 said,	 they	 lie,	 as	 symbolic	 systems,	 in	 the	middle	 of	 the	 (subjective)	 cognitive	
structures	of	the	agents	and	the	(historically)	objective	structures	of	the	social	system.	In	this	way,	
they	 constitute	 the	 system	 of	 habitus	 and	 doxa	 that	 orients	 (rather	 than	 determines)	 day‐to‐day	
work	practices,	modes	 of	 domination	 and	 resistance.	 For	 example,	 the	 field	of	 gem	mining	 in	 Sri	
Lanka,	through	a	definite	mode	of	calculation	related	to	the	appropriation	of	auction	money,	is	thus	
structured	 as	 a	 particular	 combination	 of	 seven	 categories	 of	 capital	with	 distinctive	 stakes	 and	
powers	of	appropriations.	This	field‐specific	calculative	logic	has	excluded	notions	of	profit	beyond	
the	 ‘auction	proceeds’,	 leaving	out	any	necessity	 for	detailed	cost	 calculations	and	controls	at	 the	
point	 of	 production.	 Thus,	 a	 particular	 field‐specific	 logic	 of	 calculation	 underlies	 the	 relative	
autonomy	of	labour	process	from	the	external	control	of	other	forms	of	capital.	
	
Therefore,	 this	 paper	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 accounting	 research	 that	 attempts	 to	 understand	
idiosyncrasies	of	accounting,	emphasising	the	power	of	Bourdieu’s	sociology	of	symbolic	 interests	
to	theorise	the	presence	and	the	absence	of	particular	forms	of	calculative	and	control	practices.	My	
main	argument	is	that	calculative	templates	and	procedures	constitute	a	field	specific	logic	and	they	
are	 the	 symbolic	 means	 through	 which	 structural	 properties	 of	 the	 field	 are	 cognised,	
communicated,	reproduced	and	transformed	into	a	set	of	practical	dispositions	that	orient	day‐to‐
day	work	practices,	domination	and	resistance.	This	means,	as	Hamilton	and	Ó	hÓgartaigh	(2009,	p.	
917)	also	argues,	existential	and	non‐existential	rationalities	of	particular	forms	of	accounting	and	
control	rituals	“emanate	from	the	practice	of	the	field”,	which	in	turn	to	be	found	in	and	to	be	bound	
by	 systems	 of	 durable	 and	 transposable	 dispositions	 and	bodily	 schemata	 (i.e.	 habitus,	 doxa	 and	
bodily	hexis),	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	structural	conditions	of	the	field	manifested	by	the	power	
relations	among	various	forms	of	capital,	on	the	other.	
	
This	 is	 where	 Bourdieu’s	 reflexive	 sociology	 become	 immensely	 useful	 vis‐à‐vis	 contemporary	
analyses	 of	 “how	 forms	 of	 accounting	 emerge	 from,	 sustain	 and	 modify	 wider	 institutional	 and	
social	structures”	(Hopwood,	2000,	p.	763;	see	also	Hamilton	and	Ó	hÓgartaigh,	2009,	p.	917).	As	
illustrated	 in	 this	 case	 study,	 the	 potential	 of	 Bourdieu’s	 sociology	 stems	 from	 its	 capacity	 to	
connect	“carnal”	(i.e.	bodily	and	corporeal,	see	Wacquant,	2004a,	2004b)	dimensions	of	control	and	
calculative	rituals	with	wider	relations	of	power	(i.e.	capital)	in	a	particular	field.	It	helps	us,	on	the	
one	hand,	together	with	rich	ethnographic	accounts,	to	understand	accounting	as	a	carnal	practice	
(i.e.	practices	so	inseparably	in	the	bodies	and	souls	of	people	who	carry	them	out	that	those	bodies	
and	souls	are	defined	by	those	accounting	practices),	and	its	defining	principles	(such	as	the	notion	
of	 true	 and	 fair	 view	and	 field‐specific	 reporting	 templates)	 as	historical	 products	 of	 such	 carnal	
practices	 (see	 also	Hamilton	 and	Ó	 hÓgartaigh,	 2009).	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 also	 helps	 us	 to	 see	
accounting	 as	 a	 powerful	 symbolic	 system	 through	 which	 structural	 properties	 of	 the	 field	 are	
cognised,	 communicated,	 reproduced	 and	 transformed	 into	 a	 set	 of	 practical	 dispositions	 that	
orient	 day‐to‐day	 work	 practices.	 Thus,	 for	 example,	 we	 see	 the	 relations	 of	 production	 (i.e.	
appropriation	 of	 surplus	 value)	 through	 the	 profit	 and	 loss	 account	 and	 we	 understand	 the	
structure	of	capital	through	the	balance	sheet.	Such	accounting	templates,	as	symbolic	systems	that	
defines	 the	 practices,	 provide	 us	with	 a	 particular	way	 (or	 perhaps	 the	 only	way)	 of	 seeing	 and	
accepting	 the	 world,	 and	 hence	 they	 become	 the	 symbolic	 means	 through	 which	 structural	
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properties	 of	 a	 field	 is	 reproduced.	 And	 it	 is	 those	 structural	 properties	 that	 necessitate	 the	
presence	of	particular	form	of	calculative	practices	while	negating	the	presence	of	any	other	form	
structurally	unnecessary.	In	this	way	Bourdieu’s	reflexive	sociology	is	helpful	in	understanding	the	
practical	and	structural	logics	of	the	presence	and	absence	of	accounting.	
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